THE NEW REPUBLIC

Percentage Politics in '62

Helen Hill Miller

Should We Veto The Troika?

Roger Fisher

The Seven Years' War

Francois Bondy

Mississippi

Langston Hughes

August 21, 1961, 25 c

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Threats and Grandeur

★ West German officials implored refugees in East Germany to stay at home – at their posts. West German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano called the flow an "unmitigated disaster." And yet the folly of East Germany's Ulbricht forced the stampede he denounced. His unsuccessful 1958 seven-year plan promised East German per capita consumption equal to West Germany's in 1961, per capita production by 1965. By this spring all doubt ended; the plan had failed. Threats and force and refugees increased. Now comes a Communist propaganda defeat as Ulbricht closes the escape hatch.

But it is a frightening situation. Will it bring a Hungarian-type uprising, involving West Germany – then all the West? NATO allies will protest violation of guarantees of free movement in postwar agreements. But they are worried, too. Ulbricht's tactics could bring catastrophe for everybody.

America's record isn't perfect. But consider three recent comments by Khrushchev. Welcoming Nkrumah of Ghana he said that "even if all countries of the world" adopted a decision that "did not accord" with Soviet interests and security the Soviets would not recognize it but would "uphold its rights, relying on force." Week before last he threatened the world with a bomb equivalent to 100 million tons of TNT. And last week, according to Reuters, he said that Soviet prestige now requires a German peace treaty – a fight, as he put it, "for the recognition of our grandeur." Does he mean these things? – nobody can deny where the threats come from.

One of the mysteries of journalism is that editorial writers never read their own paper. Here will be a news story that Mr. Black says *this*, but on the editorial page Mr. Black will invariably say *that*. The gap is only a few pages apart but it is too wide ever to be bridged. The estimable *Wall Street Journal*, July 14, accused us of "alarmist" views on school shortages because we said galloping state-local indebtedness requires federal aid. Nonsense, localities are doing all right! says the paper in rebuttal.

By a quaint coincidence we had based our alarmist reflections on a lead story in a prominent New York newspaper with this headline, (page 1, column 8) last June 2 –

TROUBLED CITIES
Their Deficits Grow
As They Try to Meet
Demands for Services

Oak Park, Mich., Policemen
Fight Fires; Boston Frets
Over its Downtown Needs

More Help From Uncle Sam?

The carefully documented article was signed "Mitchell Gordon, Staff Reporter of *The Wall Street Journal*."

Which Paper D'ya Read?

★ It is informative, perhaps, to excerpt the *WStJ*'s debate with itself –

"... We didn't realize how tough things were until we came across this last-ditch plea in *The New Republic*." (*WStJ* Editorial, July 14.)

"In major metropolises and crossroad hamlets around the country, municipal taxes are going up these days – but not fast enough to keep deficits from rising, too." (*WStJ* News Article, June 8.)

"Some states have hardly any official indebtedness. Altogether, state and local debt totals some $64 billion; that of the federal government, which has gone up 'only' 8 percent since the war, is $289 billion." (*WStJ* Editorial, July 14.)

"Nearly all city finance men contend that state and federal governments are going to have to step in increasingly to help ease the cities' worsening predicament." (*WStJ* News Article, June 8.)

"The states and localities have gone ahead in recent years building classrooms ... at a pace that could result in a classroom surplus by the end of the decade rather than the lamented 'shortage'." (*WStJ* Editorial, July 14.)

"Education's financial demands on the cities are great. New York City, for example, is spending nearly 20 percent of its current budget on education.... In Birmingham, Ala., city controller Sidney Grady Fullerton, Jr., calls schools 'the real problem with us'." (*WStJ* News Article, June 8.)

"In 1960, the volume and approval rate of school bonds set new records at elections." (*WStJ* Editorial, July 14.)

"Municipal officials complain the education burden is getting to be more of a problem for them because taxpayers are growing increasingly antagonistic toward bond issues for new schools." (*WStJ* News Article, June 8.)

The *WStJ* editorial makes these statements:

"Some states have hardly any official indebtedness."

(True of about six states which have passed debt on to cities. But since the war federal debt has increased only about eight percent; state and local debt 400 percent.)

"Only one-half of one percent of all school districts in the US have reached the limit of their available bonded indebtedness for school construction."

(If a school district spends $10 millions but is still $5 under its legal limit it comes under the generalization above, vague and largely meaningless.)

"In 1960, the volume approval rate of school bonds set new records at elections."

(There were also about 1.5 million more children. Sale of school bonds isn't keeping up with population increase.)

"No state legislature has ever asked the federal government for school aid."

(Incorrect. Better research it again WStJ.)

"Nor has a local school board official ever testified in favor of a federal aid bill."

(So many petitions have been received by Congress from local school board officials that they aren't even counted.)

Well, that's the story. Moscow has beaten us in science again, and once more at home American kids have been smugly gypped on school aid.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC *A Journal of Opinion Volume 145 Numbers 8-9 Issues 2442-43 August 21, 1961*
Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed by The New Republic, *1244 19th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Phone: FEderal 8-2494. Single copy 25c. Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00, Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Advertising rates upon request. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Include old and new address.* *Copyright© 1961, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc.* *Item g. Second class Imprint, reading Second Class Postage Paid at Washington, D. C.*

Utopia for Export

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Gilbert A. Harrison, Editor & Publisher
Selig S. Harrison, Managing Editor
Robert Evett, Books & the Arts Editor
Mary Allen, Research Assistant
F. R. Ruskin, Assistant to the Publisher

Contributing Editors:

Alexander M. Bickel, Robert Brustein, Asher Brynes, Helen Fuller, Frank Getlein B. H. Haggin, Irving Howe, Sidney Hyman, Christopher Jencks, Gerald W. Johnson, Stanley Kauffmann Helen Hill Miller, Michael Straight

In the closing passages of its new Program – the first since 1919 – the Communist Party of the Soviet Union styles itself "the brain, the conscience and the heart of the people." It is as if the *apparatchiki* who drafted the 47,000-word manifesto promulgated on July 30 had been carried away by their utopian rhetoric and, at the last moment, had mixed up their own private vision of bureaucratic utopia with the one they were supposed to be holding out before the USSR and the world.

To some the new Party Program with its vividly explicit promise of material blessings to come foreshadows a relaxation or diffusion of totalitarian control in Soviet life. And presumably this Communist affluent society would, in turn, find war and aggressive political adventure less and less attractive. The Program does indeed proclaim this the hour of transition from Socialism to Communism, pledging that "the present generation of Soviet people" will live to see the maturity of the ideal Communist society. But the state will not, after all, wither away. Or at least not until "the dictatorship of the working class will cease to be necessary." Instead one is given a utopia in Orwellian colors which somehow seem to go very well with the stern Soviet presence along the barbed wires sealing off East Berlin.

Most students of Soviet affairs were quick to agree on the deep significance of the Program as a propaganda piece in the underdeveloped countries. Originally scheduled for publication on August 20, Moscow suddenly advanced the release date in an apparent effort to tie in with the psychological offensive on the Titov space flight and on Berlin. But the implications of certain promised liberalizations in Soviet domestic institutions will properly be the subject of protracted and highly significant analysis and debate. The mere admission that the dictatorship of the proletariat might ever become unnecessary has the makings of enormous heresy. So do the pledges of electoral reforms; of a mandatory 25 percent turnover in the Central Committee and Presidium of the Party every five years, and of a devolution of some of the power now exercised by bureaucratic fiat to mass organizations such as trade unions.

The new Program comes as the climax of a determined three-year effort by Soviet ideologists to silence "revisionist" questions concerning the nature of the ultimate Communist society. As Erich Goldhagen explains in a recent study, the problem of the regime has been "to recast party ideology into a mold consistent with the demands of totalitarianism. . . . New wine had to be poured into the old libertarian

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bottles of Marxism, a wine that would not intoxicate with the desire for freedom but would instill a quiescent submission to an everlasting totalitarian order." During 1959 and 1960 the Soviet regime issued nearly 100 books, as well as innumerable periodical and press articles, detailing the image of the future Communist society. It was an image in which a more and more comfortable living standard appeared to be accompanied by the solidification of greater and greater Party power.

"Under present circumstances," the new Program now declares, "the principal danger to the Communist movement comes from revisionism . . . reflecting bourgeois influences." The people, it is said, are the "decisive force" in the building of Communism. "But the Party exists for the people, serving it." Indeed, the future will "see a further growth of the Communist Party as the governing and leading force of Soviet society." No growth of "factions or groupings" will be tolerated. The Party continues to claim sole "mastery of the scientific laws that govern social development" and thus the authority to extinguish all "bourgeois ideology" and "religious prejudices." The artist must continue to be guided along "correct" paths of artistic creation by the "solicitude" of the Party.

Conceivably, the expansion of welfare benefits will serve as a useful weapon of the Party in retaining control– not as a spur pricking the newly-libertarian impulses of a newly-prosperous and "revisionist" Soviet populace. The spreading net of state-sponsored services offers a means to frustrate any disposition toward individual ownership of houses, cars and other "immovable property," which is reserved, doctrinally speaking, for the State. With the exception of free lunches and free boarding schools, the most celebrated plank in the Program is the assurance that "every family, including newlyweds, will have comfortable apartments" by the end of the decade, and that within two decades rent will be abolished. Yet what this may mean in practice – quite apart from the fact that construction would have to be *trebled* to make a dent in the housing shortage, and that rents amount to no more than five percent of the average family budget – is more Party control rather than more individualism.

Housing facilities have traditionally been used for very basic political purposes by the regime: by attaching accommodations to employment, for example, housing serves as a stick with which to discipline workers on the job. Plentiful housing would tend to break up crowded multiple-family living and thus to create an atmosphere of privacy conducive to social independence. With an abundance of apartments available the regime would find less pretext for manipulating housing allocations to political ends. Still, housing is to continue to be concentrated in apartment buildings lending themselves to the surveillance of a manager-policeman. In general, the state appears to be assuming enhanced power over the allocation of goods and services as Soviet society moves toward what one authority has called "egalitarian collectivism."

The Sinking Ship

But while the Soviet citizen was probably bored by the long catalog of promised gains in the Khrushchev manifesto, this very length and specificity has by all indications accounted for its profound impact on the underdeveloped countries. The distinguishing characteristic of this document is not so much any one thing that it says as a general quality of concrete definition calculated to impress hundreds of millions of people who are in search of definitive models. (The Indian Communist Party has certified its confidence in the utility of the Program by placing a print order for one million copies in the 10 major Indian languages with a Bombay publisher.) Marx, Lenin and Stalin insisted

Staff Changes

With this issue Selig S. Harrison succeeds Helen Fuller as Managing Editor of *The New Republic.*

Mr. Harrison came to this journal in 1956 from a year at Harvard as a Nieman Fellow and has served as Associate Editor as well as Acting Managing Editor. He has been president of *The Harvard Crimson;* an Associated Press newsman in Detroit and New York and a resident AP foreign correspondent in South Asia, and is the author of *India: The Most Dangerous Decades.*

Miss Fuller, who has been with *The New Republic* since 1941, is planning to devote more time to outside writing. She will remain on the staff as a Contributing Editor. Her book on the first phase of the Kennedy Administration through the current session of this Congress will be published early next year by Harcourt, Brace.

The New Republic is also pleased to announce the appointment as Contributing Editors of Asher Brynes, author of *Government Against the People,* whose literary criticism and articles on agricultural, foreign trade and transportation policy have appeared in these pages; and Sidney Hyman, widely known for his definitive work, *The American President,* and an associate of Robert E. Sherwood in the authorship of *Roosevelt and Hopkins.*

Christopher Jencks, now a Contributing Editor, will shortly assume his new duties as an Associate Editor, and Miss Mary Allen joins the staff as Research Assistant.

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that it was "unscientific" to describe the nature of the ideal Communist society in particulars and asked, in effect, that they be followed on faith. But little is left to the imagination in Mr. Khrushchev's utopia. And it is utopia according to a carefully scheduled timetable.

Summoning the world to abandon the Western ship – "corroded from top to bottom" – the Program radiates overpowering self-confidence. Gone is the paranoid psychology of the Stalinist period of "capitalist encirclement." In its place one finds an almost arrogant warning to waverers that they had better get on the bandwagon before it is too late to be given credit.

The Program projects a rapid expansion of the Soviet economy with two and one-half fold increases in industrial output, agricultural production and national income by 1970. If these targets were, in fact, to be achieved, output per capita in the Soviet Union would exceed that of the United States at the end of the decade. But obviously exaggerated as they will probably prove to be, the prospect of even the partial achievement of such grand objectives arrests the respectful attention of Asians and Africans whose economies are, in many cases, languishing in virtual stagnation.

According to authoritative current estimates, the Soviet national income and product have been growing at an average rate of about seven percent per year in the Fifties and will, in all likelihood, continue to grow at this rate. Though there are signs of a slowdown in the rate of industrial expansion, primarily as a consequence of manpower shortages, this appears to be cancelled out by marked increases in agricultural production. Thus Soviet national income and product may be expected to double in the next 10 years – that is, to increase by about twofold rather than two and one-half fold as promised in the Program.

Should Soviet national income indeed be doubled within the decade it will then roughly equal the present national income level of the United States. And assuming that the performance of our economy in the Sixties is no better than in the Fifties, and that we continue to grow at an average rate no higher than three percent a year while the Soviets grow at the seven percent rate, then by 1970 the Soviet national product would be about three-quarters of the US level rather than one-half. As a practical matter, however, this means that Soviet output would *exceed* United States production in a number of areas, most probably those directly related to military potential and to economic competition in the underdeveloped countries.

With a casual affirmation that "Communists have never held . . . the road to revolution lies necessarily through wars between countries," the Program pointedly omits concessions to China of the variety found in the Moscow Declaration of the 81 Communist Parties. The new Program offers an elaborate rationale justifying the Soviet intention to continue helping non-Communist, even anti-Communist forces in power in the underdeveloped countries where this will help Soviet foreign policy. Interestingly, the Peking regime is mentioned only three times in the course of the entire document, and once, at that, during an alphabetical listing of the countries in which "socialism" has prevailed. There is also a veiled attack on the "dogmatism and sectarianism" of the Chinese.

A Dangerous Assumption

While holding to its duty to support "just wars" and reserving the right to support the revolutionary overthrow of offending governments, the Soviets, as opposed to the Chinese, now make a point of saying that in some instances the transition can be accomplished by parliamentary means. Supported by a majority of the people, the working class may be in a position to defeat the "reactionaries," "win a solid majority in parliament and transform it from a tool serving the interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument serving the working people, launch a broad mass struggle outside parliament, smash the resistance of the reactionary forces, and provide the necessary conditions for a peaceful socialist revolution."

As the proletarian movements grow, the Program predicts, there will arise in certain countries a situation in which the capitalist class will agree to the means of production being purchased from it – the proletariat, that is to say, will "pay off" the bourgeoisie.

At one point the Program suggests that if the "soft" line in a neutralist country takes too long to bring results the Communist Party concerned can feel free to break away, as opportunity dictates, from its alliance with local capitalists. The Party theoreticians in, say, India or Indonesia or Ghana or Iraq are advised that "the extent to which the national bourgeoisie will take part in the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle will depend in considerable measure on the validity of the alliance of the working class and the peasantry." In short, just as the US has learned to judge each neutralist government as a separate case, so the Soviets now show a new flexibility as well as a new impatience in their relations with unaligned governments.

In a sense the Soviet commitment to peaceful coexistence may prove even more dangerous than the old doctrine of the inevitability of war. For it is the assumption of Western weakness – above all, weakness of will – that underpins the new line. And in time, possibly as the tense current phase of the Berlin drama unfolds, the faithful may call on Mr. Khrushchev to demonstrate the courage of convictions which have now been inscribed, ineradicably if not unalterably, as Communist holy writ.

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East German Time Bomb

When West German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano arrived in Paris last week his private message to his Western diplomatic colleagues was: Watch East Germany. The fact that the seat of the "Berlin crisis" was not in Berlin at all but in the profoundly explosive mood of 14 million East Germans received surprisingly little attention as recently as a few weeks ago in the midst of a general preoccupation with the game of great power diplomacy. But the panic flight of the refugees has shown just how powerful super-states really are in the face of local factors which have a human, and therefore at times uncontrollable element.

It is the response of the East Germans and the Soviet ability to control it that will determine whether the Soviet decision on August 13 to attempt a cutoff of refugee traffic has accelerated – or blown up – progress toward some form of temporary stabilization in Germany. Those who consider the forcible suppression of the refugee movement a necessary prerequisite for successful negotiations advance a pragmatic and cold-blooded analysis: in the absence of such a clamp-down prior to the signing of a peace treaty by the Soviet Union, they argue, the East Germans would be in a position to ask for control of the air transport route used for refugee traffic from Berlin to West Germany proper. And an East German request for control over the air route would present a seemingly insoluble dilemma. Unable to deny the right of asylum and to become, in effect, accomplices of the Communist world, the Western Powers would then of necessity take an obdurate line and a diplomatic impasse would automatically follow. As it is, or so the argument runs, though the East Berliners are admittedly consigned to a dark future, the way may have been cleared for negotiations on legitimately negotiable issues – *if* the threatening posture of the Soviet divisions does, in fact, serve to discourage a large-scale popular upheaval.

The difficulty with this line of analysis is of course that the Soviets might face a Hungarian-type uprising. Moreover, the spectacle of blatant repression in East Germany will in any case arouse considerable outrage on the part of public opinion in the US, and will consequently expose the Administration to charges of appeasement should the official estimate of what is negotiable not coincide with that of the Republican National Committee. There is plentiful evidence that Mr. Khrushchev was well aware of the somber implications of his decision to insulate the border and that the go-ahead was delayed as long as possible until the flood of refugees last week forced his hand. For Mr. Khrushchev, who summoned East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht to Moscow for consultations before finally acting, knows very well that the mood of East Germany is a nasty one and that the detested Mr. Ulbricht – "Comrade Cell" even in Party circles – has a shaky hold over his own Party ranks. (He might not have known, however, that 108 commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the East German armed forces were defecting to the West at the very moment Mr. Ulbricht was in Moscow.) Finally, he knows that the US stands committed by its August 4 statement to possible "counter-measures in . . . all aspects of our relations, including economic, with the Soviet Union and the countries of the Soviet bloc."

Sino–Soviet Arena

It was hardly a surprise to State Department planners that Chinese Nationalist Premier Chen Cheng on his visit to Washington should assail the US for considering the possibility of diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia and its admission to the UN. It was predictable too that when he did bring the issue into the political arena the Administration might tentatively feel compelled to drop its plans for representation in Ulan Bator. The Chiang Kai-shek regime entertains the traditional imperial view of the territory as an integral part of China. And the sentiments of the Mao government are no doubt much the same: expediency has prompted restraint and relegated to the future any possible forcible Peking attempts to pocket the area from the Soviet Union.

The regime in Ulan Bator is today one of the oldest Soviet satellites, though, like the East European states, it cherishes an illusion of full independence. But before the fall of the Manchu dynasty, Outer Mongolia was, off and on for hundreds of years, an unwilling province of the Chinese Empire. At the time of the 1911 revolution the province broke away from China, declaring its independence in 1921 and becoming a Soviet satrapy in 1924. The Outer Mongols (who number a roughly estimated one million, and must not be confused with the Sinacized Inner Mongols) now prefer Soviet, or virtually any tutelage to the return of the Chinese.

The US had not calculated that diplomatic relations and UN entry would, in themselves, produce any sensational outward instances of independent thought or action from the Outer Mongols, or even contribute to evolution toward ultimate sovereignty. A feeling of ethnic and national cohesion has long existed in Outer Mongolia – stimulated by the Chinese danger, and by memories of the distant Mongol Empire – but this has not, in 40 years as a Moscow satellite, worked to point up any profound dissatisfaction. Public discontent in the primitive, nomadic Mongol society apparently goes no further than irritation at the immediately felt effects of legislation and restrictions imposed

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by the Central Government in Ulan Bator.

But while the foreseeable gains may be limited and speculative, the foreseeable losses are even smaller. Though one can argue with confidence that a Mongolian delegation in the United Nations would add one more Assembly vote for Moscow (though not Peking), the extent to which this situation would imperil world security is open to doubt. The problem of the balance of power between East and West in the Assembly has, in any case, become antiquated by the emergence of assertive interest groups from Asia and Africa who may soon obtain an absolute majority. In the coming UN session the Administration apparently intends to abstain on the admission of Outer Mongolia and seek to persuade the Chinese Nationalists that they too should abstain. The US is anxious to avoid a clash with the so-called French African group over the admission of Mauritania, which can escape a threatened Soviet veto only if Outer Mongolia has clear passage. But in our view the entry of Outer Mongolia has an independent importance as a means of opening up to Western study this pivotal arena of Sino-Soviet rivalry. And so does the eventual establishment of an American Embassy in Ulan Bator.

Miracle in Portland

Several months ago, writer-lecturer Milton Mayer walked into the shiny new editorial office of the *Portland Daily Reporter*, Portland, Oregon, sat down at a typewriter and wrote a message to the staff: "You can't start a newspaper in America. You can stop a newspaper, merge a newspaper, corrupt a newspaper, ruin a newspaper, buy a newspaper, or sell a newspaper. But you can't start a newspaper in America. The *Portland Reporter* is, therefore, un-American, by virtue of the fact that you can't start a newspaper in America. As my late employer, Mr. W. R. Hearst, was wont to say, I'm a newspaperman myself."

Mayer's remarks were printed and delivered the following day to the paper's more than 50,000 subscribers. In the face of an accelerating trend toward merger and one-ownership newspaper cities, the steady progress of *The Portland Reporter* is an event that commands national attention.

It was born out of the angry turbulence of a strike against the city's two established dailies, the morning *Oregonian* and the afternoon *Oregon Journal*, and launched as an eight-page weekly February 11, 1960. Its first home was a cubicle with four desks and two typewriters. The original issue, which carried one classified advertisement, announced that "this publication is not the forerunner of a third daily newspaper. It is planned to exist only until the day an honorable accord is reached in the present dispute – a day all of us hope will soon be arriving."

Hope for any sort of accord never was realized and *The Portland Reporter* "went daily" on the first anniversary of its first issue. Some 40,000 advance subscriptions poured into the circulation files before that department had lifted a promotion finger or given away a single bicycle. (Now, hope has been finally destroyed with the purchase of the *Journal* last week by the *Oregonian* ownership – Samuel I. Newhouse.)

A. J. Liebling has observed that "freedom of the press extends only to those who own one." With a burgeoning roster of nearly 6,000 stockholders in 47 states, the *Reporter* may very well be the most widely-owned newspaper in the country. It has met and apparently is beating down a charge by its two competitors that it is "that labor rag," and fortunately the great bulk of organized labor in Oregon has understood that the paper's survival depends upon its freedom to exercise independent editorial judgment. Advertising lineage has increased 56 percent in six months.

Of the 140-odd Guild members who walked out of the *Oregonian* and *Journal* November 10, 1959, in support of the Stereotypers strike, more than half have gone back to work or found other jobs. Those who stayed out and went with the *Reporter*, many of them the top byliners in town, formed the core of a professional reportorial and editorial staff. They take fierce pride not only in their newspaper, but in their own ability to withstand the lures and pressures that have conspired to defeat them.

"The *Reporter* now becomes the only independent, Oregon-owned newspaper voice in Portland," said the paper in a front-page editorial on August 5, following Newhouse's purchase of *The Oregonian*. "It accepts this responsibility with great pride . . ."

The paper is a rare phenomenon – all the more rare because it appears to be succeeding. Portland is distinguished as the only city of its size in the nation where people have a choice of a trio of newspapers, one of which speaks with a lively liberal accent. It has forced its competitors to do a more thorough and more honest job, and the entire community has benefited from an enlargement of press freedom. Would that as much could be said for Los Angeles, San Francisco, Phoenix, Chicago, Detroit, Indianapolis, etc. etc.

Suffer, Little Children

"I don't like to see my taxes paid for children born out of wedlock." – Senator Barry Goldwater as quoted in a UPI story of July 18.

This seems as good a definition of Goldwaterism as we've seen.

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THE CUBAN REVOLUTION'S "INTEGRATED" MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY

Castro and the Communists

Havana

The leader of the Cuban Communists, Mr. Blas Roca, candidly admitted the other day that the Cuban revolution had not followed any pattern prescribed by the textbooks of Communist ideology. Those whose minds were molded in the discipline of Marxism-Leninism, he said, "are faced today by new phenomena which are not to be found in any book, and for which no formula nor any manner of solution was previously known."

The most important of these "new phenomena" is, of course, the fact that the proletariat and the Communist Party did not play the leading and guiding role stipulated by Lenin in bringing about the Cuban revolution. This is quite openly admitted in Cuba even today. A revealing exposition of some of the differences of opinion between the Communists and Castro's Movement of the 26th of July at the time of the guerrilla war is to be found in one of the first specimens of the new Cuban "revolutionary literature," Jose Soler Puig's *Bertillon 166*, now available in a cheap paperback edition in every Cuban bookstore. In *Bertillon 166* a Communist liaison man is sent to Oriente Province by Party headquarters in order to establish contact with the 26th of July Movement. In his debates with Castro's men he makes no bones about the fact that he strongly disagrees with their methods, with their bomb-throwing and their assassination of Batista soldiers. He maintains that workers do not approve of bomb-throwing, that soldiers should not be killed but won over to the cause.

The most important task, according to the emissary, is to organize the working-class, for "the workers are the main force in every real revolutionary movement."

"If we conducted the war in the manner you propose," a Castro man replies, "it would become another Ten Years' War."

To win the allegiance of the working-class by ceaseless propaganda, to regiment the workers into mass organizations and then to use these as the striking-force of a revolutionary coup – that is indeed Lenin's classic recipe for revolution. Yet in the entire history of the Communist movement Lenin's formula has not once proved successful in clandestine struggle against a despotic dictatorship. Even the Bolsheviks did not in the first instance overthrow the collapsing Tsarist regime. In China, the Communist-sponsored workers' rising of 1927 ended in utter defeat. It was guerrilla warfare that proved a winning formula for Mao as well as for the Yugoslav and Vietnamese Communists. The coup in Czechoslovakia was staged under the extremely favorable conditions of actual participation in a parliamentary regime. The remaining Communist regimes came into being with the help of the Soviet Army.

Communist losses during clandestine activity are invariably much heavier than those suffered by clandestine organizations based on different, more appropriate principles. The Communist Party, being essentially a centralized, rigidly disciplined propaganda machine, needs freedom of movement in order to expand.

Now that Castro is in power, the conditions of work afforded to Blas Roca and his party by the Fidelista regime are surely the most favorable a party organizer could imagine in his wildest dreams. For two years the Communist Party, which in Cuba calls itself the People's Socialist Party (PSP) has enjoyed not only complete freedom but even, in the absence of any other political party, a virtual monopoly of organizational and propagandist activity. It was put in control of the trade unions on the national and local levels and entrusted with the indoctrination of the Militia and other mass organizations of the revolution. Party advisers and supervisors are to be found in every nationalized enterprise and every branch of the administration. Yet for all this it would be incorrect to maintain that the PSP has taken command of the Cuban revolution. In Cuba, policy is still being formed and all major decisions are still being made not by the Politburo and Central Committee of the PSP, but by Castro and his innermost circle of friends, who are not in the PSP hierarchy.

Superficially, the Cuban revolution has followed the familiar pattern of the Russian revolution – a constant leftward movement with the most radical group, in this case the PSP, getting stronger all the time. Some of those who observe the scene from abroad have therefore assumed that the result would be the same as in Russia, with Castro either being pushed aside by the Communists, as Kerensky was by the Bolsheviks in Russia, or at least becoming their helpless puppet.

Yet to assume this is to carry the analogy with previous revolutions too far. Both the French and the Russian revolution were marked by a fierce, uncontrolled struggle between successive groups of leaders. In Cuba, on the other hand, one and the same group has been in undisputed command of the revolution from the very beginning, and they have never allowed events to escape their control. Purges and shifts in

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power and influence have been restricted to figures of secondary importance. There is no reason to believe that things might be otherwise today and that the authority of Fidel, Raul Castro and Ernesto Guevara is being threatened by Blas Roca's PSP or any other group. If the Cuban revolution has moved steadily leftwards, it is not because the PSP has pushed Fidel in that direction, but because he himself has willed it so.

The leftward swing of the Cuban revolution was already implicit in Castro's decision to confiscate American property, which brought about a conflict of increasing gravity with the United States government. Since the Cuban middle class is strongly pro-American, Castro thereby lost their support, and he relied more and more on the working-class instead, using the PSP as his intermediary. And the PSP leaders gladly and unstintingly lent him their services.

Meanwhile, the development of the conflict with the United States also caused Castro to move even closer to the Soviet bloc. When the flow of American oil stopped, the Soviet Union sent its tankers. When the United States government cancelled the sugar quota, the Soviet Union and other Communist countries bought up the bulk of the Cuban sugar crop. Thus Cuba was twice saved from economic collapse by Soviet intervention. In addition, the Soviet bloc has given steadfast support to Cuba in the United Nations.

These events have evidently left a deep impression on the minds of the rulers of this very small country engaged in a bitter conflict with a giant neighbor. They appear to them to confirm everything ever written by Lenin about the evils of imperialism, and completely to justify Nikita Khrushchev's claim that the Soviet Union is the champion of small nations and the natural leader of all anti-imperialist forces. Castro and his friends have thus become fervent disciples of Marxism-Leninism. Today, their admiration of the Soviet Union is so great that they regard all criticism of that country as being mere slanderous propaganda. Under the circumstances, Mr. Blas Roca and his party obviously have no reason to pick a quarrel with Dr. Castro.

Of course this does not mean that Castro has ever contemplated taking a PSP membership card and subordinating himself to the orders and discipline of that party's Central Committee. The actual course of events was forecast early in June by "Che" Guevara. The party of the masses, Guevara stated at that time, had not yet been organized, but it already existed in what he described as "the genuine unity of the revolutionary organizations." "The only thing that still remains to be done," said Guevara, "is to form the Party with Fidel as its Secretary General."

A decisive step in this direction was taken some weeks later, when Castro's "Movement of the 26th of July" and the "Revolutionary Directorate" – two groups that had not actually been functioning as organizations for quite some time – were fused with the PSP into a new body called "The Integrated Revolutionary Organizations" (ORI). As the Havana daily *El Mundo* recently divulged, an experienced Polish-born Cuban Communist with a long record of revolutionary activity in Latin America, Fabio Grobart, was appointed "director" – no doubt meaning chief organizer – of the ORI.

In private conversation, regime spokesmen have insisted that the ORI was a kind of Popular Front, and not a party, but there were indications that it was actually more than that, and that the organizations which have been "integrated" in it have given up their separate existence. At the time of writing it is not yet known whether the constitution of the ORI as a political party and the nomination of Castro as its Secretary General are imminent, or whether they will be delayed for reasons of political expediency. But there can be little doubt that Cuba will soon adjust itself to the norms prevailing in the Soviet camp by adopting the Dictatorship of the Proletarian Party as its form of government. The Cuban revolution will then at last have its Party as a leading and guiding force, thus conforming to Marxist-Leninist prescriptions.

The experienced cadres of the old PSP will certainly occupy key posts at all levels of the new Party organization. Observers abroad will doubtless interpret this as final confirmation of their assumption that the Communists have turned Castro into their puppet.

Yet the man who shot his way into an army camp at the head of 160 poorly armed insurgents, and who later led a landing party of 88 to victory over an army of 40,000 in a two years' civil war, is certainly not going to take orders from any party machine. The machine may be composed of old PSP men, but the bulk of the Party members will owe allegiance to Castro and to no one else. In the event of any conflict with the machine, he would certainly not hesitate one moment to appeal to the members themselves, and any opposition would be swept away in a minute. Blas Roca has a reputation for shrewdness and caution, and he is doubtless aware that he could never control and manipulate Castro even if he wanted to. So what is actually happening is not that the Party is taking over the revolution from Castro, but that Castro is taking over the Party.

This is a major event not only for the island of Cuba, but for world Communism as well. As the head of the first Marxist-Leninist party actually in power in the Western Hemisphere, Castro will be in a position to assert his leadership of the movement in all of Latin America. He cannot, of course, muster anything like the military and economic strength of Nikita Khrushchev or Mao Tse-tung, but his status and his political influence in the international Communist movement may in its way be comparable. Ernst Halperin

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Laying A Few Traps

In the international poker game it was a mistake for Comrade K to raise Mr. K's bet on that Berlin deal, for Mr. K not only saw him, but raised him, and not only raised him but, as Pogo would say, raised him the ever-lovin', blue-eyed limit! Apparently Comrade K, like a man of sense, has thrown in his hand, and Mr. K takes the pot.

Good enough. But the game goes on, under the same rules. Nobody has introduced a wild card since Truman produced an army with seventeen different battle-flags to fight in Korea. But the joker's in the deck, all right, and Truman spotted it. "Khrushchev," he said, "is afraid of what's behind him." China is the joker: how that card should be played, who knows? Not, apparently, Comrade K. Not, certainly, Mr. K.

Yesterday is always out of perspective, historically speaking. A thousand years after the event Gibbon could trace with assurance the decline and fall of the Roman Empire; but Gibbon raised to the *nth* power could not describe with equal assurance the decline of the United States in the past eight years.

One reason is that only now are we beginning to acquire some faint perception of the real basis of that power. Popular mythology, of course, was always certain. Popular mythology based it on atomic fission; and to this day only the more perceptive Americans begin to see that the ingenuity that made use of nuclear power was only an adjunct to the ingenuity that adapted to our purpose psychological power.

But the truth begins to emerge. Truman, still an under-rated President, is now seen to have dealt successfully with five great crises – Greece-Turkey, the economic collapse of Europe, the collapse of the war-time alliance, the revolt of the colonies and Korea. But what is as yet only dimly apprehended is probably the most significant characteristic of his statecraft – he never met two successive crises with the same device.

In the Greek-Turkish affair he used drill-sergeants and munitions to bolster the Greek army; in the European economic collapse he used money in the Marshall Plan; to replace the collapsed alliance he organized NATO; to the revolting colonies he offered Point Four; and in Korea he fought. Each device was skillfully adapted to that particular crisis, none being a repetition of any of the others. Even when he fought in Korea he fought under the banner of the United Nations, a thing that had never been done before. In other words, his basic reliance was on brain-power rather than on either military or economic power.

Any attempt to classify Harry S. Truman as an intellectual would evoke scornful hoots – reasonably, in view of the popular idea of what constitutes an intellectual. But he always had ingenious, fast-thinking men about him and he had the nerve to use them; therefore his administration will some day be accounted one of our brainiest, for few have been able to produce five brand-new ideas to meet five brand-new crises.

But since 1953 not one genuinely original idea has appeared in national politics until Kennedy came up with his Peace Corps; and even that was rather a development of Point Four than breaking a new path. But it does suggest that the new administration has some comprehension of the realities of high politics, where brain-power has priority over any other.

In 1950, when the United States was able to lead seventeen nations – with the passive approval of thirty-five others – into battle, not for conquest, but for an abstract principle, it touched the highest point of political power that it has ever attained.

To recover the moral hegemony that Eisenhower frittered away is the task confronting President Kennedy. Holding Berlin is merely incidental. He can hold Berlin by convincing our antagonists that if we are shoved out we shall come out shooting. But he cannot regain moral dominance of the world by that means, or by any means other than the means by which it was won in the first place – by out-thinking all opposition.

No rational man supposes that we can lay down our arms in the present situation, strong as is the temptation to save money by that means. Truman almost fell into that trap just before Korea. Kennedy has evaded it by using Berlin to rouse the country. But it is not enough to side-step the opponent's traps. One must lay a few of one's own. Stalin fell into one of ours when he rejected the Marshall Plan. President Kennedy now has a fair chance to see what he can do in that direction. If he possesses himself, or can find in his advisers, the necessary brain-power, he can make his administration one of the most notable in our history.

But no more than Eisenhower can he do it by using the warmed-over ideas of the Truman crowd. They were good in their day, but that day is gone.

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Should We Veto the Troika?

by Roger Fisher

Soviet insistence on a tripartite administration – communist, western and neutral – for international organizations has been portrayed by journalists, editorialists and cartoonists in extremely simple terms: any organization is unacceptable which allows one country to veto any decision. That is the popular verdict. But as I hope to make clear, troika and the veto cannot be described or dismissed that simply.

Let me say at the outset that what is being discussed in Geneva, Washington and elsewhere is the *right*, not the power, to veto. For in the case of inspections under the proposed test ban treaty, the Soviet Union would have the actual physical power, whatever agreement is signed, to frustrate any particular inspection within its country. With actual control over roads, railways and airfields within its boundaries and with a large army on hand, the Soviet Government could block an inspection by such means as closing a road, putting sugar in the gasoline of the inspection vehicles, or detaining the inspectors. Such frustration could be accompanied by plausible excuses which would obscure the question of whether the action was or was not in violation of the agreement. Particularly where speed of inspection is important it would not take great ingenuity to produce a series of "explanations" which would significantly delay inspection without providing a clear-cut breach of the treaty. Whatever a test ban treaty might say about vetoes, a country which had in fact cheated and conducted a secret test without openly repudiating the treaty would hardly permit the international inspectors to come and establish beyond doubt that it *had* broken its pledge. The evading country might contend that the inspectors had been subverted by the other side and that any further inspecting would have to await agreement on new and satisfactory inspectors. It might charge a violation of some provision by the other side. In brief, whatever a treaty says, any major nation can frustrate international action within its borders and often elsewhere.

There are two basic elements in the Soviet troika proposal which are often confused. The first is that decisions should be made by a group representing different points of view rather than by a single individual. The second is the right of veto. Let us look first at the "group decision" feature.

ROGER FISHER *is a Professor of Law at the Harvard University Law School.*

In the case of the nuclear test ban, the Soviets have proposed that there be "an Administrative Council of three equal representatives, one each from the principal groups of states – the Socialist states, the countries belonging to Western military blocs and the neutralist states." The theory underlying this proposal was summarized in the Soviet memorandum given President Kennedy in Vienna:

> "The control commission, on which all principal groups of states will be represented, can adopt sound, just decisions, taking into consideration the interests of all states. However, it is not enough to take such decisions. It is imperative to guarantee their impartial implementation. Impartiality cannot be guaranteed if the implementation of the decisions is left to one man alone."

Now, in suggesting that important decisions should be made by a group rather than by an individual Mr. Khrushchev has said nothing new or controversial. Americans are familiar with the device of giving a group rather than an individual responsibility both for formulating policy and for carrying it out. After Congress has decided what policy should be and has adopted appropriate legislation, it is often reluctant to leave its implementation to a single person, as is illustrated by the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Trade Commission and other regulatory agencies. Policy decisions in our private corporations are made by boards of directors, and even at the level of execution, the executive committee is common. Military policy in the Defense Department is implemented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No clear line can be drawn between the forming of policy, where it is generally recognized that joint wisdom is best, and the carrying out of policy, where the efficiency of a single responsible officer is usually desired. If we, with our common bonds, interests, and law are unwilling to trust a single official we should understand better than we do the concern which the Soviet proposal reflects.

Where the views of different representatives in a group are sharply divided, as might be the case between representatives of East and West, the product of the group will tend to be less a collective judgment and more a collective bargain. But where interests sharply conflict, the group process can nonetheless be a useful means of arriving at an acceptable accommodation.

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Having said this, I must add that the particular three-headed monster proposed by Mr. Khrushchev would seem to be ill-designed. There is little value in assuming, and thereby accentuating, a division of the world into three defined camps, each of which can theoretically be represented by one point of view. Moreover, if neutrals are to exert a moderating influence upon representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, it would be better to have several of them rather than one. There is enormous pressure on a single neutral whatever the merits of particular issues may be. However, Mr. Khrushchev is certainly less concerned with giving the neutrals a vote than in getting the veto for himself. The group-decision feature of the troika proposal thus raises a question of degree: how far down toward the details of administration do the benefits of collective judgments and bargaining outweigh the drawbacks? This is a matter which can be discussed and for which any solution, inherently, requires balance and compromise. To repeat, the group-decision feature of the troika proposal is not something to which we should object on principle. But how about the veto?

The Right of Veto

In the light of the physical power which a major nation has to use its army or its police to veto proposed international action against it, the continued existence of an international organization may depend upon there being some legal way of exercising that power. To provide a right of veto at some stage is to recognize the limited power which any international organization has, for example, over the United States and over the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union had not had the legal right of veto within the Security Council during the past 15 years, it is unlikely that the United Nations would exist today. It is at least probable the Russians would have wrecked a veto-less UN dominated by the West.

The existence of a legal right to exercise a political veto may protect an international administrative machine in another way. If there is no permissible veto, the international civil servants or neutrals who are making decisions must take that into account. They will have to ponder the political resistance to their decisions and whether a particular decision might be "unacceptable" to a major power. One can conceive of a neutral in a veto-less test-ban organization being approached by the Soviet representative with the suggestion that he has been voting too often with the Western members and that the Soviet Union may have to break up the organization unless he will go along with the Soviet Union on a particular vote. Or such an approach might be made by a US representative who thinks that a neutral has been too pro-Soviet. In such a situation, a conscientious neutral may conclude that it is better to preserve the international organizaion than to conduct an inspection. ("Both sides have such quantities of nuclear weapons that even one test, if it did occur, is not terribly important; far better to vote in a way which will preserve the chances of continued international cooperation and eventual disarmament.") Requiring the administrative staff to take into account the factor of political unacceptability runs the risk of corrupting its integrity.

On the other hand, the existence of a legal right of veto at the political level tends to free the international civil servant from having to modify his judgment to make it politically acceptable. He can give his honest, scientific or impartial views, without having to assume the risk of wrecking the institution by his own action, since if the decision is unacceptable to a major power, that country may veto it. ("If you don't like my decision you can veto it, but I must do my duty as I see it.")

Moreover, the veto, like the group decision, is deeply rooted in Anglo-American law. For centuries we have insisted that representatives of the people be given a veto power over the enforcement of the criminal laws. Many famous trials, such as that of Peter Zenger in 1735 for printing a libel against the Governor of New York, demonstrate that one of the purposes behind trial by jury is to give the people a veto over the enforcement against one of them of laws which the people do not want to see enforced. Not only does the jury as a unit have a veto in every major criminal case; the requirement that the jury's verdict be unanimous gives each of the 12 jurors veto power over a verdict either way. And on the other side the prosecutor is usually given unreviewable discretion to veto the prosecution of any case. There are, of course, differences between the restraints which people impose on a government and those which governments impose upon international organizations. But if within a community like the US we are so distrustful of authority that we insist upon a system of checks and balances, we should understand that comparable checks and balances may be necessary in a community where there is far less mutual trust.

As a matter of fact, the draft nuclear test ban treaty submitted this spring by the United States and the United Kingdom included a significant number of provisions involving a veto. For example, the major powers are given a right of veto over the appointment of both the Administrator and the Deputy Administrator. The initial location of fixed air inspection routes is subject to veto by the country being inspected, as are the locations of the fixed components of the inspection system. More significantly, perhaps, under the Anglo-American draft treaty "the total amount of each annual budget shall require the concurring votes of the original Parties." The US Government has thus adopted

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a flexible attitude towards the veto. Not only did we include various veto provisions within our draft treaty but undoubtedly we would have given consideration to additional veto provisions. We thus recognized the veto as something to be dealt with in practical terms depending upon particular circumstances.

The Soviet position has been represented as being that a veto must apply to everything. With respect to nuclear testing *Life* magazine reported: "The Soviets say now they will accept only the 'troika' system whereby any of three members could veto any inspection." This is incorrect. The Soviet Union has publicly recognized that the veto is not something to be applied across the board. With respect to nuclear testing its troika proposal involves a veto on matters to be decided by the vote of the Administrative Council. In a section of its June 4th memorandum which was not given wide publicity in the United States, the Soviet Union explained that ". . . On-the-spot inspections within the limits of the agreed quotas must be effected at the request of the side interested in the inspection without any voting in the control commission or any other agency. All that is needed are objective readings of instruments at control posts indicating that a phenomenon took place in some part of the given country which might be suspected as a nuclear explosion. If there is such objective reading, the Soviet proposal envisages that neither the Control Commission nor any other body of the control organization can interfere with the satisfaction of the demand of the side for an inspection. Hence, no obstacles to inspection, to which the United States representatives refer, speaking of the so-called 'veto', can be created by the Administration Council."

Breaking the Rules

How the Soviet Union would actually behave is another question, but one which cannot be answered in advance, regardless of whether a treaty should contain words about a troika or words to the effect that there should be no veto whatever.

But there is another side to the coin – the disadvantages of a veto. If an international organization is to be effective, it must be able to do or say things which will at least tend to persuade governments to comply. What are the forces that are used by an international organization in seeking to persuade a government to act? And what is the effect on those forces of a veto?

The forces which will tend to cause a government to respect the decision of an international organization can be roughly divided into three kinds:

Fear of world opinion. Governments which spend vast sums on propaganda want to look good, not bad, in the eyes of others. An international organization which can produce a "binding" decision automatically marshals world public opinion to some extent in favor of compliance with that decision.

Fear of action by other governments. In considering whether to comply with the views of an international organization, a government must take into account the possible retaliatory action which other governments might take should it fail to do what it ought to do. Should the Soviet Union refuse to allow an international inspection team to inspect in accordance with a test-ban agreement, the Soviet Union would have to consider how the United Kingdom and the United States might respond. The more clearly it appeared that the Soviet Union was defying an obligation the more likely would be the responsive action by other countries. The ability of other countries to act and their freedom of action would depend in turn upon how clear it was that the first government acted improperly.

Institutional pressures of a government toward respecting rules. To the extent that officials have been taught that they ought to do what they are legally obliged to do, they will tend to cause their government to comply with decisions of an international organization. A government cannot exist without rules. Institutional inertia tends to make it easy to go along with an existing rule. On the other hand, to break the rule usually requires not only that someone take the initiative



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to suggest doing so, but also a collective decision among a group of officials that this particular obligation should be broken. Freedom to rise above these constraints is likely to be exercised only at the highest levels where deterrent political considerations can be most effective.

If these are the principal forces on which an international organization must rely to cause a government to comply with its expressed view, one can see how a permissible veto may undermine the effectiveness of such an organization. An adverse world public opinion is created when a government does not do something which it "ought" to do. But if the government in question has the recognized right to veto the decision of the international organization there is far less moral stigma in not complying.

Likewise, other states will find it more difficult to take retaliatory or responsive action if a government is simply exercising its rights than they would if it were defying a "binding" decision of an international organization. The right of veto thus makes it possible to avoid unpleasant consequences which might follow were a state simply to exercise its physical power of indirectly frustrating a decision.

Internally too, the institutional pressures in support of the decision of an international organization are seriously weakened if the government has a right to veto that decision. Officials will feel little moral obligation not to veto a decision, and no obligation to comply with a decision that has been vetoed.

The existence of a right of veto in an international organization may thus seriously weaken the effectiveness of the organization. *But the choice may be between having an organization subject to a right of veto or having no organization at all.* The Soviet Union can *now* veto the creation of any new international organization capable of making binding decisions upon it. If the choice is between having no international organization and having one that is subject to a right of veto, we would probably prefer the latter.

The extent of a multi-national organization's influence will depend largely upon how far it can proceed toward clarifying the rules and the facts *before* a veto can be exercised. And clarifying the facts requires that factual data be made public. But even this is not usually enough. Data can be disputed or confused by conflicting data. The more that there is an official determination and characterization of the facts the more clear-cut the situation will appear.

Similarly, the effect of a veto is less serious if an international organization is so constructed that the veto can be exercised only after the organization has defined and made public the particular action which, in the absence of a veto, it would undertake. Such a process defines the issue sharply. The same forces which deter a government from breaking a legal commitment tend to deter it from exercising a veto *if a veto requires the government to stand in the public view* and frustrate what a world body thinks ought to be done.

Finally, if the exercise of a veto requires affirmative action at a political level, rather than inaction at the administrative level, the restraints against exercising the veto will be greater.

My point is that the practical effect of the right of veto on a multi-national organization is a matter of degree. Jurors may exercise their veto in secret at the fact-finding level, free from the restraining influence of public opinion. The President, who in the pardon power has comparable authority to let criminals off, must, however, exercise his veto in public after there has been an official determination that the man is guilty and ought to be punished.

Safety Valve?

Suppose, for example, that the proposed nuclear test-ban organization were set up in such a way that there were an administrative determination, below the veto level, that a suspicious disturbance of seismic magnitude 4.75 or above had occurred in a designated locality which would be eligible for inspection. A Soviet veto at such a stage would provide the basis for both an adverse world reaction and responsive action by other countries. Suppose, instead, the test-ban organization were set up in such a way that no release of factual data nor official determination that a seismic event had occurred could be made without the consent of a Soviet representative. Then it would be far easier for the Soviet Union to frustrate an inspection.

The difference between requiring consent at every stage and permitting a "safety valve" veto was demonstrated in the Security Council vote to increase the UN forces in the Congo. The Soviet Union had made clear its position that the UN troops should be withdrawn. If the release of factual reports from the Congo and a decision on what to do had required Soviet consent, such consent would probably not have been forthcoming. But as it was, the Soviet Union was presented with a majority decision of the Council in support of a resolution calling for an increase of UN troops in the Congo in the light of official factual reports. At this stage the Soviet Union found that it chose not to exercise the right of veto which it had.

A veto in an international organization is thus like a safety valve on a steam boiler. If the safety valve is set to go off too quickly it will prevent the machine from accomplishing much – although such a machine may still be better than none. If there is no safety valve at all the machine may blow up. And, as with a safety valve, a veto can be designed in such a way that it will not prevent the machine from doing its job.

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Military Aid and the Ethiopian Revolt

by Christopher Miniclier

US military missions and Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) are presently active in 42 countries – 11 in Asia, 12 in Europe, 16 in the Americas and 3 in Africa. What role do these missions play inside the host countries? The story varies from place to place, from command to command. But a brief account of what took place last December in Ethiopia, where a 90-man United States Military Assistance Advisory Group has been assigned since 1953, may provide some disturbing clues – indicating perhaps why the President found it necessary last month to remind all of our Ambassadors in a special letter that *they* are responsible for US policy within their jurisdiction.

Ethiopia's 400,000 square miles border the Gulf of Aden and the southern end of the Red Sea to the East, Kenya to the south and The Sudan to the west and north. This 3,000-year old country is one of the wealthiest, and most backward, in Africa. A leading Western agronomist, noting that some areas of the fertile central plateau have top soil to a depth of 12 feet, has suggested that properly-trained and equipped Ethiopian farmers could feed their own country and half of Europe. But the farmers live in windowless mud huts and till their small holdings with one-pronged wooden plows drawn by horses, oxen or camels. Less than two percent of the 20 million inhabitants are literate. Graduates of fourth grade are qualified school teachers.

His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie I, 225th ruler of Ethiopia in direct descent from Solomon and Sheba, has done more for Ethiopia, during his 41 years in control, than anyone before him. He has unified the country's 110 different ethnic groups (who speak more than 20 different languages) under a central government, sent students abroad to stury, and begun a nationwide health and education program.

Half the parliament is appointed by the Emperor and everything must have his approval. Millions of Ethiopian dollars are being spent on making Addis Ababa a show place – but the streets are filled with barefooted beggars. Meanwhile, students who were sent abroad are returning home zealous to speed development.

It was against this background that the much publicized, abortive *coup* of last December occurred.

This is what happened:

On the night of Tuesday, December 14, officers and men of the elite Imperial Bodyguard moved into key positions in and around the capital city of Addis Ababa, taking control of the country's only radio station.

On Wednesday the Crown Prince of Ethiopia, allegedly speaking under duress, broadcast a statement announcing the *coup*. In part, he said:

> "Ethiopia has a recorded history of over 3,000 years, but through all these years the primitive methods of agriculture and old methods of trade and other methods of eking out one's living have not undergone any changes. . . .
>
> "Empty promises can no longer satisfy the people who now want concrete action aimed at improving their standard of living . . . the people of Ethiopia realize that these new nations [of Africa] are advancing fast, leaving them behind. The people, like bees in a disturbed hive, can no longer tolerate oppression. . . ."

Leaders of the abortive revolt were among the Emperor's most trusted officials. Firmame Neway, a provincial governor and a graduate of the University of Wisconsin who earned his master's degree in public law and government from Columbia University in 1954 (his thesis: "Impact of White Settlers' Policy on Kenya") was one of the leaders. He was killed while under arrest. His brother, Brigadier General Mengistu Neway, 44, was commander of the Imperial Bodyguard. He was publicly hanged in March.

"The whole conduct of the *coup* was pretty idealistic and naïve," a political officer at the American Embassy commented. "They could have attacked the first day but no shot was fired. As far as we can determine the *coup* leaders were against bloodshed. They apparently hoped to win over the masses, and then spend Wednesday bargaining with the Loyalist Army."

On Wednesday the rebels had odds of 5-2 over the Loyalist Army's First Division. Had they struck they might have wiped out the Loyalists before the other two divisions, stationed in the Eritrea and Somali regions, could have arrived to help. Instead the rebels kept on talking. That afternoon they invited the diplomatic representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom to the royal palace to explain their position and ask for recognition. Ambassador Arthur Richards promptly cabled Washington

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CHRISTOPHER MINICLIER *has just returned from a six-month trip through Africa and the Middle East, including a visit to Addis Ababa.*

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and requested instructions. No reply was received he says. The *coup* was crushed two days later.

Thursday morning the regular weekly staff meeting was held at the American Embassy compound. Brigadier General Chester B. DeGavre, commander of the MAAG detachment and former deputy division commander of the tough 82nd Airborne Division, told the Ambassador that the Loyalist troops had asked for advice and that he was ordering his men to assist and advise them. This action was taken with the Ambassador's "full approval."

That afternoon fighting broke out for the first time, as Loyalist Army units, supported by American-built F-86 jet fighters, launched an all-out attack on the rebels. An estimated 1,300 persons, including many civilians, were killed or wounded in the capital city between 2:25 Thursday afternoon and Saturday.

Friday afternoon the rebels invited Ambassador Richards to serve as a neutral go-between. After notifying the Loyalist Army, which ordered aerial strafing stopped, Ambassador Richards took a rebel message to the Emperor's forces and returned with their reply. (The reply refused surrender terms to the rebels, although the Ambassador, who had no time to have the message translated from Amharic, did not know this at the time.) Moments later fighting erupted again and Ambassador Richards, unable to find his embassy driver, escaped from the rebel-occupied royal palace by jumping through a window.

US Air Force Colonel Robert L. Ramsey briefed his men Thursday, after the commanding general's decision to provide aid and advice, and told them to come to the air base in 20-minute intervals "to avoid exciting the bodyguard." Colonel Ramsey stayed with his men from Thursday afternoon ("in the tower and on the line") until his return to Addis Ababa on Saturday. He arranged for communications between the Loyalists' Army and their air force and established a system of marking Loyalist vehicles so they could be identified from the air. (Two months later donkeys in Addis Ababa still wore white painted, encircled X's.)

General DeGavre, who has spent two years training the Ethiopian Army as part of a $60 million US military aid program, joined the Loyalist Army general Thursday afternoon and stayed with the Loyalist troops until the revolt was over. "I wasn't in a position to be of any assistance, saw no tactical map, and knew nothing at any time of what his tactical plans were," DeGavre said afterward. "I would have advised if I could." At the time of the *coup*, no policy had been laid down governing the US military adviser's role in the event of an internal uprising. The US Embassy admitted it was "caught completely by surprise" when the rebels took over. No other country took sides. A MAAG colonel defended joining the Loyalist troops by explaining "after all, we were assigned to the government in power." But a West African diplomat in Addis Ababa asked: "Why should a country born of revolution go around suppressing other revolutions?"

By Saturday, when the Emperor returned triumphantly to Addis Ababa, it was all over.

Riding ahead of the Emperor, in his drive from the airport to the palace, was Colonel Ramsey, seated in an open jeep beside the commander of the Loyalist air force. Colonel Ramsey's public appearance, plus the pin-point strafing and close, wing-to-wing maneuvers of the F-86's, prompted rumors that the planes had been flown during the revolt by American Air Force pilots, rather than Ethiopians. (Subsequently, in an attempt to stifle such rumors Colonel Ramsey had Ethiopian jet pilots push back their canopies and remove their face masks before taxiing by the reviewing stand during a post-revolution air show in February. The colonel explained to Ambassador Richards that all the American pilots assigned to the Air MAAG in Ethiopia were white. Nevertheless, State Department officials at the Embassy would not support his denial that Americans flew during the fighting. These officials seemed disturbed by the fact that three US pilots – two majors and a colonel – and four Air Force technicians were unaccounted for during the revolt – "pinned down" by small arms fire in Addis Ababa from Thursday afternoon until Saturday. Israeli road builders, Italian shop keepers and Ethiopian students still talk of "the American pilots who flew the planes.")

American support of the Loyalist forces was not confined to Ethiopia. A United Press International story from Washington on December 22, credits an Air Force sergeant stationed in Monrovia, Liberia, West Africa with saving the Emperor's throne.

"For want of a nail a Kingdom was lost. . . ." the UPI story opens. "US Air Force officials have a modern day true story of another incident, small in itself, that may have changed the course of history." In this case the throne was saved, suggests the UPI reporter. He detailed how an Air Force communications net stretching from an Air Force plane over Monrovia to Andrews Air Force Base in Washington, D. C., to Europe and thence to the US station in Asmara permitted the Emperor to pause on his flight back from Brazil and confer with Loyalist generals in Ethiopia.

When a top State Department intelligence official stopped over in Ethiopia last February with the new Assistant Secretary of State, G. Mennen Williams, he was asked what official US policy was at the time of the revolt. "There was no policy. Everyone just did what he could to smooth things over," he told this reporter. But State Department officials in Washington say: "The policy has always been, 'if it's an internal matter we stand aside'."

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Percentage Politics in '62

by Helen Hill Miller

The 1962 elections are just around the calendar, and the great game of percentage politics is adorning countless scratch pads with countless doodles at the National Committee headquarters of both parties.

Only once in the last 40 years – in 1934 – has the party out of power failed to improve its lot in the off-year. Dazzled by this prospect, the Republican National Committee's new Chairman, Rep. William E. Miller of New York, has stated: "Now we, in order to gain control of the House of Representatives in 1962, must gain 44 additional seats besides the ones we now hold. We lost 34 seats by a little less than five percent of the vote in 1960. . . . So I think that, historically, the off-year being the best year for the out party, the fact that we came so close in many of these areas in 1960, the fact that reapportionment in many areas will help us – these and many other factors I think make it entirely within the realm of possibility that we can gain control of the House of Representatives in 1962."

In a parallel reaction, Charles D. Roche, deputy to Chairman John M. Bailey of the Democratic National Committee, warned his party's national committee members, at the end of May, that "a five percent shift in the vote away from the Democratic Party would mean the loss of 9 governors, five US Senators, and 38 Congressmen; conversely, a similar gain would add 9 governors, 9 Senators and 48 members of the House."

Was Mr. Roche unduly alarming? There are 34 Democratic governors, 16 Republican; the Senate has 64 Democrats, 36 Republicans; the House, 263 Democrats, 174 Republicans. In some states, notably California, astute reapportionment by a Democratic legislature has brightened Democratic prospects. But in at least four states – Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Minnesota – there is a good possibility that the redistricting required on the basis of the 1960 census will not have been carried out in time to be effective next year; if so, all of their Congressmen would have to run at large. In such circumstances, Democrats whose districts have been "safe" by many percentage points will suddenly find themselves imperilled by exposure to a state-wide electorate that is much more evenly balanced. The four states mentioned will send 71 members to the next Congress. Thus, each party has more to worry about in '62 than just the marginal districts.

Traditionally, a party out of power orients itself around its chief personalities on Capitol Hill. When their party controls the legislative branch, as the Democrats did under Eisenhower and as the Republicans did (more briefly) under Truman, these personalities are a foil for the White House; they compete with the President for the public attention; they make headlines as national figures. The winner-take-all rule of American politics dims the luster of the just-defeated Presidential candidate as his party's titular head; and since a defeated party's next chance to recoup its political fortunes is in the upcoming Congressional contests, there is where interest and hope turn.

In the case of the Republican Party, a Congressional orientation is less disruptive than it is for the Democrats. Republicans in the upper echelons of the Congressional committee structure are drawn from a cross-section of the party's representation, without the sectional preponderance that the seniority system has awarded Democrats from one-party Southern states. The image presented by the Republican Congressional Party is therefore on the whole satisfactory to Republicans throughout the country. Further, the attention given to members of the Congress has been accentuated by the emergence of the national legislature as a seedbed of Presidential timber. A big-state governorship is no longer the open door to greater political glory. Today, all big states have awkward, almost implacable problems: financial solvency, transportation, taxes, education, racial tension, and all the sprawling evils of urbanization. The image of a strong executive who, in political terms, has met a payroll is hard to project from a state executive mansion.

Among major contenders in the 1960 Presidential race, the only figure in either party who was not serving in a national position was the Governor of New York, and in his case there was a record of past federal service and recent White House consultantship, as well as an impressive series of reports on national and international issues presented by the task forces of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Mr. Nixon, being aware of the perils of state office, has expressed reluctance to undertake a campaign for the governorship of California, though he may be compelled to swallow his reluctance; for his emigration from Washington removed him from the national stage, leaving Sen. Barry Goldwater and Gov. Rockefeller where they were.

Likewise, reflecting the trend toward legislatively based parties, last year's National Party Chairmen were Sen. Thruston Morton of Kentucky and Sen. Henry M. Jackson of the state of Washington. On

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Senator Morton's resignation (he is up for re-election in his state in 1962), the GOP National Committee went no further than to the other wing of the Capitol and tapped the chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, Rep. Miller. (In another respect, however, Mr. Miller's selection represents a change: he is a Catholic, whereas with a single previous exception, and that not in the present century, Republican chairmen have been Protestants.)

A Very Special Skill

The new Democratic Party boss, Mr. Bailey, like almost all of his predecessors, is a Catholic too. But more significant, he is from Connecticut; and if one is to understand what is happening to the National Committee under his leadership, that Connecticut background must be examined. For here "percentage politics" has been cultivated as a fine art. For over a generation (with the exception of Mr. Ribicoff's second gubernatorial race) when Democrats have won, their margins of victory have usually ranged from about 1,000 to about 3,000 in a total state vote approximating one million. Finding a ticket that can cross the wire first in such a photo-finish, in a state with the intercultural complications of Connecticut, demands a very special skill – one exercised in back rooms in the early morning hours. This type of politics is Mr. Bailey's specialty. Connecticut, long after most states abandoned it, has retained the convention system of selecting its slates.

The component constituencies which Mr. Bailey has had to satisfy in Connecticut are the basic Irish, who tend to stay hitched to the Democratic wagon; the important Italians, successors to the Irish immigration, who stray easily; the aboriginal Yankees; the name-conscious Poles; the Jews who, with Mr. Ribicoff's rise, forced others to make room for them.

In such a state, issues complicate campaigning. Policy discussion is divisive, especially since recently prominent issues such as civil rights and foreign affairs are matters of relative indifference to the basic Irish. Organization is what counts and it is this that the party is there to provide.

With this background and his lack of familiarity with other parts of the country (normal to a new National Chairman), it was natural for Mr. Bailey to approve disbanding the National Advisory Council of the Democratic Party and its issue-conscious subcommittees, the discontinuance of the *Democratic Digest*, the downgrading of the research division and the reduction in force of the committee staff – all of which took place rather rapidly. In recent months, a major activity of the Committee has been the prospering effort to eliminate the Democrats' imposing post-campaign deficit – the Party treasurer, Mr. McCloskey, who was also raised in the back rooms of Democratic politics, has moved from Pennsylvania to Washington to further this effort.

The chairman's background and personal proclivities, however, only partially explain recent changes in Democratic headquarters. As soon as a party gains control of the White House, its political magnet is 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. The center of attraction is the President and his immediate aides.

Equally inevitably, since January, the preoccupation of the White House political staff, reflecting the preoccupation of the President, has been to get the most it could from Capitol Hill. When the Democrats control both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, this is difficult: the legislative leaders become members of a supporting cast, and few prima donnas enjoy that role. Further, with practically all key chairmanships held by Southern Democrats, most of whom, in their home territories, support the national party in whispers (or maintain potent silences), the national party is often faced with what amounts to a choice between suicide and self-mutilation. If the programs the Administration sends up are negligible enough to attract votes from the Southern Democrat-Republican coalition, it loses support in sections of the country essential to Democratic success; if, through patronage or the location of federal installations (income from the federal government is a major source of income in Virginia), the President cajoles the margin of Southern cooperation necessary to pass a stronger program, the White House by this very process facilitates the continuance in office of the Congressmen and Senators who cause the trouble in the first place.

It can hardly be expected that the White House political staff will give much attention to other than legislative matters until Congress adjourns and the aides have caught their breath. But – will it then be too late to assure that the Democrats will carry critical sections of the country in 1962?

Where blocks of votes are obtainable by reaching an understanding with one man, politics is a fairly simple operation, and in some areas of the US this method is practicable; in these instances, all that Mr. Bailey needs is to become acquainted with the key personalities, coast-to-coast. But this kind of politics is primarily big city politics, and is less relevant in the West, in the South and in suburbia.

The West is a major new source of Democratic strength but it is a two-party region that is fluid and unpredictable as of now. The South is the scene of increasing erosion to the Republicans; even with the thoughtful redistricting that has taken place in North Carolina, there might be three Tar-heel Republicans in Congress next year. Suburbia houses millions of voters who have recently been subtracted from central-city

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influence and are feeling the oats of independency.

During its years out of Executive power, the Democratic National Committee invented some long-range devices to snare this more-or-less independent vote. In doing so, the Committee acted on several basic assumptions. One was that the National Party should be an entity in its own right, with an ongoing reality to individual members, year-in and year-out, from one administration to another. Tied to this was a recognition of the value of a sustaining membership, through which individuals can contribute directly to the National Party and become card-carrying Democrats. Particularly in the South, such membership has enabled Democrats who lean intellectually more toward the national than to their state party to feel they have a political home. (It was interesting to note, in the joint TV appearance of the two National Committee chairmen on August 10, that Mr. Bailey plugged the sustaining membership with a hearty endorsement.)

Another assumption was that the middle-income voter will move in one of two directions: the party of the *status quo* will attract him because of his satisfaction with his new status, or the party of progress will attract him because of what it stands for. The party of new ideas, in other words, will grow only to the extent that its new ideas are carried to the electorate, especially the middle-income voter. Various position papers produced by subcommittees of the National Advisory Council and distributed both as pamphlets and through the *Democratic Digest*, which had some 74,000 subscribers at the time publication was terminated, were steps in this direction. On a state scale, the "participative politics" developed under Neil Staebler in Michigan was a classical case of involving the electorate in politics by concentrating on issues. It worked at the polls and was imitated in a number of other states under the direction of Mr. Staebler as chairman of a special National Committee task force.

A third assumption was that party skills need to be developed all down the line. Thus, regional organizers were made available to local Democrats through the National Committee; regional training conferences were held; efforts were made to enlist volunteers in constructive party work.

Between the 1960 election and the inauguration this January, mobilization of available skills for executive appointments took place in what was undoubtedly the most thorough and far-reaching talent-search ever conducted by an American political organization. This structure was dismantled after the initial appointments had been made, but the need to staff the foreign aid agencies has recently led to the appointment of Dan Fenn of the Harvard Business School as a talent scout in the White House. The process could well be extended to personnel for use in the Democratic Party.

Ins and Outs

There has been a certain pattern in national party operations: the "out" party, after a period of recuperation, begins to stress organization; the "in" party neglects it. When we come to the Eisenhower Era, however, this pattern changes. Continuing and developing the organizational procedures begun in the late 1940's, the Republican Party has been progressing right through the two Eisenhower administrations for all the world like a party out of power. . . .

But the Democrats had been improving too in a rather remarkable way. Unlike the Republicans in 1932, the Democratic Party in 1952 took no vacation to recuperate. . . . The Party found a way to keep its image clear, at least to a degree, through the invention of the Advisory Council . . .

The great upsurge in the Congressional elections of 1958 may be considered a composite of the skillful work of the Congressional Democrats, the firm line developed by the Advisory Council, and the vigorous organizational work of the National Chairman, Paul Butler. But now the two parties are shifting again. The Republicans, smarting under Presidential defeat, are accelerating organizational activity. Divided on Party image and program, they nevertheless are united at the local levels by the strong courthouse groups, and everywhere by their willingness to pour money, energy and talent into organization at every level.

What is now happening to the Democratic Party? At the national level, the extensive "out-party" programs of the 50's have expired, with little indication yet of what is to take their place. As usual, there is a hugh deficit. Perhaps more significant, there is the time-honored idea held by some politicians that a party in power depends upon its officeholders, and only a party out of power on its grass roots. . . .

Both parties can use help from their national organizations. But there is a special reason why the Democratic Party needs this kind of organized effort even more. The Republican Party has a much greater capacity to continue and grow. In every community there is the tendency toward the status quo, toward conservatism, toward "right thinking," toward the retention of the powers that be. Moreover, as the average age of the population increases, as the average income rises, so this tendency gains . . .

But because the Democrats are the Party of change, they have a less fixed constituency. In '52 and '56 a quarter of the Eisenhower votes came from people who called themselves Democrats, and 15 percent of the Nixon votes came from the same source. The Democrats are clearly the Party with looser ties; with a more shifting, mobile, volatile membership.

– Neil Staebler, *former Michigan Democratic State Chairman, in an address at Harvard University, February 13, 1961.*

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Early in June, Mr. Bailey announced the appointment of 10 new subcommittees of the National Committee, to consolidate and build Democratic Party strength; last week, he announced seven new staff appointments. "Operation Support," complete with kits of rainbow flyers, flip charts and outlines of major issues is now being mounted through the office of the Committee Vice Chairman, Mrs. Margaret Price.

But as next year's elections get closer and closer, evidence of unrest, particularly among Congressmen and Senators from difficult areas, has mushroomed with regard to appointments. They would like to have a hand in filling the high-level posts of wide visibility that bring honor to the party over an entire state, and they would like to have as many hands as possible in filling the less exacting posts through which a candidate may secure crucial local devotion.

One major complaint concerns the small turnover in posts filled by the Republicans. A recent study by *Congressional Quarterly* of approximately 220 officials or personal aides brought in by President Eisenhower shows that 58 have stayed in government service. Numerous Senators also have very specific complaints about Republicans from their states who have been given honors of various sorts by the present Administration. At a recent private dinner with Chairman Bailey there was some very frank talk on these subjects.

GOP Organization Man

Meanwhile, in the Republican Party, there have been significant moves toward tighter organization and toward satisfying an outparty's yearning for issues.

The recent Minneapolis convention of the Young Republican National Federation registered an upset that brought in as Chairman Len Nadasny, a young executive of General Mills. Since 1949, effective control of nominations to the Young Republican chairmanship has been exercised by a group sometimes referred to as "the syndicate," master-minded by Mr. William Rusher, publisher of the *National Review*, through a coalition of delegates from the big swing states—New England, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio. The decline of this conservative ideological coalition began several years ago when the Rockefeller boom in New York state brought forward young people of the liberal attitude of Rep. John Lindsay; the syndicate was forced to rely increasingly on the "square states," those solid rectangles of Republicanism beyond the Mississippi. This March, the Ohio Young Republican organization was taken over by novices who promptly endorsed Nadasny, and the change occurred.

Unlike Mr. Rusher, who is said not to have voted in several recent elections because there was no one conservative enough to warrant support, Mr. Nadasny is willing to compromise in order to broaden the Republican base; though himself a Nixon supporter, he views with equanimity the election of Republicans in the big cities, even Javitses or Rockefellers. An organization man by vocation, he plans to uphold the primacy of organization politics. Field men will now work out of national Republican headquarters to carry YR organization to the South and the Rocky Mountain areas. Regional leadership schools are being held: permitting, for instance, Senator Tower and some of his aides to tell New Orleans how they did it in Texas.

Particular attention will be paid to college campuses, in the conviction that it is the group under 22 who are finding John Birchism fashionable. The Young Republicans now divide into two generations: the very young, who are close to "the syndicate," active members of YAF (Young Americans for Freedom), ardent admirers of Barry Goldwater; and the young who range from a few years out of college to that indeterminate age at which they admit they have ceased to be Young Republicans and infiltrate the regular organization.

While Republican National Chairman Miller is attentive to the advantages of concentrating on organization, he did announce just before his executive committee session in Chicago the end of June, that he plans immediately after Congress adjourns to invite party leaders to meet and discuss national and GOP problems. This is bound to mean some discussion of issues.

A tempting opportunity to make an issue over Berlin has caused the National Republican Congressional Committee (in a manner not reminiscent of the party's views on appeasement in 1940) to cite 30 instances of "a general softening in the attitude of the Administration's dealing with the Soviet Union"; in parallel, Senator Dirksen has indicated that the Senate Republican Policy Committee may make a statement.

Meanwhile, a group of Republican Congressmen representing a broad range of positions, aided by academic economists, has been preparing some 24 task force reports, covering such subjects as balance of payments, economic growth, structural unemployment.

So the perennial question, "What's a political party for?" is currently being given ambivalent answers. In each party, the merits of organization are affirmed. The city organizers, who look on adult education as something for the panty-waists, cite situation after situation in which "if you let fly with one more idea, we'll lose." The organizers from the suburbs and the wide open spaces counter that voters who are unmoved by appeals to party loyalty and repelled by suggestions of economic reward will prefer the vagaries of "independence" to party affiliation and party work unless the party itself means something to them; their position is "One idea less, and that one percent is gone."

Next year's election will offer a test of both theories.

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Marginal Utility in the Magic Kingdom

There I was in Fantasyland, panic-struck, because the Disneysun was about to set in the Disneywest, and I had too many "C" coupons. I was thrust into a frenzy of what I believe the economists call "marginal calculations." It was 40 minutes of our valuable time against our even more scarce and valuable money against a fistful of these Disneyland coupons against a return (by the Los Angeles Freeways) another day against that one remaining footpound of parental energy against the marginal increment of Satisfaction the children would receive from a last ride through Alice's Wonderland. It was sort of a paradigm of the American consumer's plight. There were plenty of goodies available – too many – all gleaming and glossy in their appeal: but which ones did we want?

We had (as I recall) five "C" coupons, good for all 30 cent Adventures; two "B" coupons, good for all 20 cent Adventures (are you following me?); and one "E" coupon, good for all the very big Adventures, like the Monorail (a short train ride), the Submarine (not operating in the winter), and the Mine Train through Nature's Wonderland.

We had some adult coupons and some children's coupons, except not the right ones, and not the right number, of either.

We had these coupons good "at any time," but then we also had some special winter season coupons, good on any Adventure, but only until May 21.

We still had (just barely) some actual money, with which no doubt still more books of coupons admitting us to still more Adventures could be purchased.

Time was running out, because the Disney-doors close at Disney-six in the off season. Energy was running out, not only because we had had a long day walking in from the parking lot, but also because, while we were in Injun Joe's Cave on Tom Sawyer's Island, the electricity failed and the lights went out, leaving the Grandmother gripping a grandchild's hand, in total darkness, trying to find the way out in the middle of a clutch of squealing teenagers.

With every faculty alert to Maximize our Satisfaction, I stood there, by the Sleeping Beauty's Castle, trying to calculate. It would come out just right to use all the "C" coupons on the Fantasyland Autopia, except that nobody wants to ride on the Fantasyland Autopia. We could send one child on the Matterhorn bobsled with the "E" coupon, except that we don't have a coupon to send an adult down the Matterhorn with her, even if any adult would go. We could ride on the Mike Fink Keel boats, except that they are over in Frontierland and it would take too long to get there. ("There's only half an hour left, Daddy, let's ride on something!" "Quiet, child, I'm figuring!") We could take Walt Disney's own Santa Fe and Disneyland train around through Walt Disney's own Grand Canyon, but, when you come right down to it, why? We could take the Pack Mules, but that probably meant another waterfall and splashing (going under waterfalls and through puddlers and generally getting splashed with water is big in Disneyland). We could use the winter coupons and save the eternal coupons for another day, except that you have to pay $1.60 admission to get back in to use your old coupons. We could all join the girls in their trip through Storybook Land, except that means using these high-powered coupons for a low-powered ride, an obviously uneconomic move.

Or we might possibly take the three-year-old on the motorboat cruise again, except that he's already been on it three times and nobody else could possibly stand another ride.

My wife, still bouncing gently from her last Adventure, tugged quietly at my sleeve, and pointed a mute, unsteady finger at the Adventure just ahead of us, "King Arthur's Carousel."

"But it's – for heaven's sake! – only an "A" Adventure," I cried.

"It's late, dear, and we're all tired."

So we thrust a motley collection of coupons in the hand of a startled attendant, and ended our day in the Magic Kingdom by all riding on what used to be called, in old unDisneyfied carnivals, a Merry-Go-Round.

Here's an idea, Walt: Why not install some electronic machine (in Tomorrowland, say) into which, on first arriving, the eager consuming family could feed its data (David wants boats; Cynthia wants Fairy Tales; Grandmother doesn't want to get her hair wet), which would solve all those simultaneous equations and come up with a scientifically calculated schedule (10:30: children to Peter Pan; 10:45: grape juice; 11:00: all ride Mark Twain Steamboat). It would help to even things out, Walt, and anyway you could charge at least a "D" coupon for using it.

Meanwhile, I have this leftover "C" coupon, adult, number F169259, good on the Dumbo Flying Elephant, the TWA Rocket to the Moon, the Indian War Canoes (closed at dusk) and any other "C" Adventure, and I guess you can just strike it off the books.

William Lee Miller

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The Seven Years' War

by François Bondy

During the night of October 31, 1954 – under the government of Pierre Mendès-France – a series of outbreaks which erupted in the Aurès, one of the most inaccessible mountain regions of Kabylia, revealed that a maquis movement had been set up there. The Algerian War dates officially from that moment; in three months, therefore, it will be seven years old. This war, following closely on the heels of the Indochinese campaign of an equal duration, has not only brought death to hundreds of thousands of persons – no conclusive figures have ever been established – but it also has shattered the Fourth Republic. The regime which represents itself as a government is, in effect, merely an interregnum. Whereas the Algerian nationalist fighters are a threat only to French positions in Algeria, the abandonment of which has already been confirmed by referendum in France, the French extremists who wish to push this war to the limit, and especially the military men in this group, are a threat to the last remains of freedom in France itself. The situation of a country more seriously endangered by its own nationalists than by foreign scheming is not new in history; but today, in the face of the Algerian War, it is a factor which determines and transforms the entire French outlook into the future.

France and Algeria: Complementary Enemies
by Germaine Tillion
(Knopf; $3)

In the meanwhile, the Algerian freedom-fighter movement has increased both in coherence and in strength; even the Moslems, who disapprove of its merciless methods, feel an increasing sense of solidarity with it. For French official circles, in accordance with a familiar process, the "handful outside the law, without roots in the people" has become "the interlocutor" with whom, at this very moment and for the third time, representatives of the French Government are seeking to establish the terms of a peace which, in any case, confirms the "provisional government" of Ferhat Abbas as the representative of the masses of Algeria.

Before this war, and to an even greater extent prior to 1939, little has been done in France to publicize the Algerian problem, or even to make the public aware that such a problem existed. One of the rare efforts at direct enlightenment was undertaken at that time by Albert Camus – then a radical young Algerian journalist who had not yet broken with the Communists – who published a study of social conditions among the Kabyls. If at that time too little was read about Algeria, today it is the very superabundance of studies, eye-witness accounts, reports, and articles on Algeria which might easily discourage anyone seeking to obtain a clear picture of the situation. But even if most of the writings inspired by a given occasion or trend are of only passing value, one thing is certain: the realities concerning Algeria are no longer unknown in France.

French Algeria rated absolute zero in the awareness of the French people; however, an Algeria in revolt against French domination – "the Algerian Algeria," in other words – has become a much more living reality to many Frenchmen.

The ethnologist Germaine Tillion, who spent the years from 1934 to 1940 in Kabylia, where she was engaged in scientific research, has written about Algeria with warmth and generosity, against a background of a unique human experience. Mme. Tillion was one of the first organizers of the Resistance Movement in France; she witnessed the death of all her friends of that period, surviving as a deportee in a camp under extremely harsh conditions which undermined her health. Through her political and human experience she was able to achieve immediate human rapport with the chiefs of the Algerian "resistance" and, unlike certain young Frenchmen who, in search of a cause, identify themselves totally and blindly with the Algerian nationalist revoluton, she has retained a critical attitude and a frankness of expression which have made her all the more respected.

Her *Algeria: The Realities* (1957) was intended for very limited distribution to an Association of Former Deportees. It was through outside suggestion, at the instigation of a publisher, that it came to be published as a book which has had profound repercussions. In this book, she insists on the fact that colonialism alone does not explain the disintegration of Algeria and what she calls the turning into beggars ("clochardisation") of the impoverished Algerian masses. The entire under-developed world, and not just its colonial portion, has been affected by the destruction of the handicraft industries and the increasing of the population without creating the corresponding outlets. Political independence would not diminish the interdependence between Algeria and France, and Algeria's dependence on the revenue which France alone can continue to assure to her.

Germaine Tillion has been repeatedly attacked by the Left as one who is behind the times because she emphasizes economic needs at a moment when po-

Summer Schedule

During the summer months, *The New Republic* will not appear on the following dates:

July 17 July 31
August 14 August 28

Weekly publication will be resumed with the issue dated September 4.

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litical revolution is the first item on the agenda; but she might equally well be accused of harboring "advanced" ideas, since she sets forth problems which independence, far from solving, can only render more glaring.

Her new book, *France and Algeria: Complementary Enemies*, is a collection of miscellaneous writings, produced between 1957 and 1961, the majority of which appeared as articles in *Preuves*. It is, accordingly, a work both fragmentary and fragmented, often forsaking the subject of Algeria altogether to indulge in lengthy dissertations on the psychology of the French people and even on Canadian folklore traditions. Nevertheless, through her indirect approach, sometimes startling and even bizarre, Germaine Tillion stimulates the reader to thought and reflection. By contrast, most of the other authors who write on Algeria tend to impose their conclusions on us. In a way, her historical thinking is very akin to that profound sense of reality which, over the past twenty-odd years, the North African novelists have evoked in us. She has herself put her finger on the source of her originality in a reply which appeared in *L'Express* to the book of a young university writer who attacked her violently: "I have done a great deal of listening to the Algerians without ever dreaming of indoctrinating them, and I have acquired the habit of not drawing conclusions for them."

Two parts of this book are of special importance and will surely be quoted in every future history of the Algerian insurrection: the second chapter, "Testimony for a Man Condemned to Death," and the fourth chapter entitled "War." In these, Mme. Tillion testifies as to her conversations with a chief of the rebellion, Saadi Yacef, and of a militant nationalist, Zohra Drif, both condemned to death (and perhaps saved from execution as a result of her testimony). In these interviews, we hear for once the voice of an Algerian insurgent undistorted by his own propaganda objectives, or by an unduly antagonistic or admiring interrogator. By making a personal appeal to his honor, Germaine Tillion induced Yacef to promise her that he would cause all terroristic outbreaks to cease as long as there would be no capital executions of Algerians. And she testifies that throughout the entire territory, this chief was able to honor his word, and that it was only the resumption of capital executions which rekindled the fires of terrorism. Since, for the average French press, engaged as it was in psychological warfare, the cessation of outbreaks was not considered as proof of the chiefs' authority over their men, but rather as evidence that the movement was disintegrating, Saadi Yacef's attitude did not gain him any political or moral advantage, and appears to Germaine Tillion as all the more admirable because of this fact.

In the chapter called "War," the author gives a chronological account of the incident of the first plastic bomb which exploded in the city of Algiers in July 1956, and which resulted in 53 dead and countless injured, all Moslems. As it happens, this was a French bomb. The first murderous FLN bomb was not touched off in Algiers until two months later, in September. Thus, it would appear that in Algiers "counter-terrorism" actually preceded terrorism. This very serious affirmation, made public by Germaine Tillion in *Preuves* and *L'Express*, and later in her book, has never aroused any contradiction or attack, although many other documentary writings on Algeria have been confiscated by the officials.

Over and above these events, the agonizing and atrocious aspects of which are more familiar to her than to anyone, Germaine Tillion remains convinced that France and Algeria will retain a great many ties with each other, and that these ties, for Algeria rather more than for France, will continue to be a condition of progress. Psychologically, the recognition of Algerian independence appears to her a prerequisite basis for any and all future "partnerships." Perhaps even Germaine Tillion sees that the relationship between France and Algeria, as a result of the size of the European population in Algeria and the mass of Algerian workers in France, is too exclusively a *tête-à-tête*. Just as France and Germany, after so many wars, today feel that they are partners, so the destiny of France and Algeria could be one of extremely friendly collaboration. Blood dries faster than any other fluid, as General de Gaulle once said to an Algerian.

Nevertheless, it does seem conceiv-

Mississippi

(Words For A Plastic Sax)

In the Negroes of the Quarter
Pressure of the blood is slighter higher
In the Quarter of the Negroes
Where black shadows move like shadows
Cut from shadows cut from shade
In the Quarter of the Negroes
Suddenly catching fire from
The wing tip of a match tip
On the breath of Ornette Coleman.
In neon tombs the music
From juke box joints is laid
And free-delivery TV sets
On gravestone dates are played.
Extra large the KINGS and QUEENS
At either side arrayed
Have doors that open inward
To the Quarter of the Negroes
Where the pressure of the blood
Is slightly higher
Due to smoldering shadows
That sometimes turn to fire.
Help me, Yardbird!
Help me!

LANGSTON HUGHES

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able that the Franco-Algerian problem would be less acute if it were broadened and even diluted within a larger overall picture. There was nothing to prevent discussing the future of Algeria at a roundtable, with Moroccan and Tunisian participation, in such a way that what now in France looks like a retreat, a shrinking, an evacuation, and a loss, would, on the contrary, have looked like the reconstituting of a great Franco-Maghreb unit and hence a gain. The psychological advantages would have been obvious, but there would have been still others, and first of all the advantage of preventing that war of succession of the Sahara, of which Bourguiba's attack on Bizerte may well have been one episode.

In Algeria too, as in Morocco and Tunisia, certain Frenchmen must inevitably emigrate; whereas for purposes of education, technology, and many other fields of activity, still others will inevitably be attracted to Algeria. Thus, for the long haul, the differences in the relations between France and the three Maghreb countries could tend to diminish rather than be heightened. It is true that Mme. Tillion is not one to hand out prescriptions. Better than this, she has made many Algerian nationalist administrators understand certain economic problems which the men of the FLN have always tended to underestimate and which are not reflected at all in their program. And she has made many Frenchmen understand that the revolutionary Algerians who dream of independence are the very ones with whom a common ground of interest can be found. Today, the people of France believe in the reality of Algerian nationalism.

But Germaine Tillion wishes to go beyond this cruel lesson in reality, which could move France from total engagement to a disengagement which would make Algeria a wasteland, politically and perhaps, too, from the human viewpoint. She views facts in terms of human relations and human drama. *Complementary Enemies* is not a good book, in fact in one sense it is not a book at all; but it is the itinerary of an exploring mind endowed with moral imagination, and it is a great historical and human document.

"TWAIN'S MISSISSIPPI *is a dream of possibilities—of freedom from the Calvinism and puritan will that came so early between the American and his natural sympathies. It is as if the geographical vastness of America had lain waiting through the centuries for some adequate consummation, for a sympathy commensurate with its variety, for a sensibility that would outlast the mere desire to dominate.*"

From the current issue of NATIONAL REVIEW. Write to Dept. R-5, 150 E. 35 St., New York 16, N.Y., for free copy.

A Man Who Lived With Failure

by Asher Brynes

The Winter of Our Discontent
by John Steinbeck
(Viking; $4.50)

The curtain rises and we are in the midst of a man-and-wife dialogue. The setting is a bedroom on a sunny morning. It is Good Friday, which commemorates the agony by which man may be redeemed. Ethan Allen Hawley spouts bits from the Bible and the Golden Treasury and Mother Goose. Mary Hawley protests happily; her responses are a sweet chorus to his flights of fancy. Then the Problem appears.

Ethan is the lone offshoot of a line of grandees who once owned much of this old whaling town, but now he clerks in a grocery store and his employer is a "wop." All that is left of his New England patrimony is the house his ancestors built – and mouthfuls of words in place of the cash in strong-boxes. So he masks his bitterness with a persistent gaiety of speech. Since the Hawleys live in a small community and were once people of wealth, their lack of money is almost unbearably conspicuous. Besides, Ethan's two children have actively average tastes for the consumption of merchandise.

When a fellow townsman, a teller in the local bank, meets Ethan on his way to work the two fall into casual discussion of bank robbery. After Ethan has unlocked the store, the banker himself appears. This neighborly magnate proceeds to rub home the fact that it is improper and even stupid for the scion of one of the first families of the town to earn a living by plying a broom. Next, Margie Young-Hunt drops in for a pound of coffee; but before she leaves the reader knows he has met the woman who will nudge Hawley to act. Finally, at the end of the morning the Italian owner of the store, silently lets himself in with his own key as Ethan is preparing to leave. There is a scolding but affectionate exchange of talk between them; the Italian immigrant who made good is revealed as a hardfisted and sterling character. Ethan departs carrying two heavy bags of groceries, every item honestly charged against his own account.

The rest of the novel is the story of a man who lived with failure for a long time and woke up late, so late that he is obsessed with the idea of neglecting no opportunity to grab what he should have had all along. He literally leaves uncommitted no sin that can profit him. He even tries to perpetrate an unnecessary theft because he remembers that talk about a bank robbery.

As in all his major fiction, Steinbeck wants to instruct and warn the reader as well as entertain him. *The Grapes of Wrath* dealt with rural people in a Western setting; and he knew them so well that despite the fact that he sandwiched a full chapter of generalizations about them between each chapter of the earlier novel, few readers found those digressions objectionable. Here the allegorizing is more obtrusive. Another demerit is the absence of a controlling point of view such as the Jeffersonian agrarianism which served him so well in sorting out the significance of things when he wrote of country people. Here the iron-handed way in which he implements (that *is* the proper word) all omens and ties all strings and punishes all important sins – those which involve betrayals of trust and affection – gives *The Winter of Our Discontent* an unintended pathos. It is clearly a comeback effort, and as clearly a failure.

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JULES FEIFFER

PEOPLE FORGET THAT **OURS** WAS THE **FIRST** REVOLUTIONARY COUNTRY! TO WIN THE COLD WAR WE MUST **RETURN** TO THE CONCEPT OF **REVOLUTIONARY** CHANGE.

REVOLUTION! IS ANYBODY LISTENING?

SO WHEN PREVIOUS COLONIAL COUNTRIES BEGIN, AS IT SEEMS THEY **MUST**, TO TOSS OFF THE YOKE OF THEIR OPPRESSORS IT BEHOOVES US TO **TRAIN** OURSELVES TO SUPPORT THEM IN THEIR ASPIRATIONS.

WELL, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID WE **SHOULD** MAKE SACRIFICES.

ONE REALIZES THAT IN THE **FORM-ATIVE** STAGES SUCH A POLICY CHANGE MAY BE MOST **DIFFICULT** SINCE, IN MANY CASES, SAID OPPRESSIVE YOKE IS OFTEN A NATO ALLY OR A NUMBER OF AMERICAN OWNED FRUIT, OIL, SUGAR, MINING, TELEPHONE, OR SOFT DRINK COMPANIES.

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HOWEVER WHILE IT MAY BE UNREALISTIC TO BELIEVE THAT WE WILL CO-OPERATE IN THE EVACUATION OF OUR **OWN** CORPORATE WEALTH, IT **IS** COMPLETELY REALISTIC TO **USE** THAT WEALTH FOR TRADING PURPOSES WITH OUR ADVERSARIES.

CLEVER YOU! CLEVER, CLEVER YOU!

The Hall Syndicate, Inc

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NO KIDDING, YOU'RE **BRILLIANT**, YOU KNOW THAT, MARVIN?

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BY EXCHANGING AREAS OF EXPLOITATION WE MAY **YET** BE ABLE TO BUILD THE COLD WAR TO A STAND-STILL.

IF PRESIDENT KENNEDY COULD HEAR YOU NOW - I **SWEAR** MARVIN, THERE'D **BE** NO ARTHUR SCHLESINGER.

9-20

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ART

Art from the Archeologists

Sumer: The Dawn of Art
by André Parrot
(Golden Press; $20)

Indian Art in America
by Frederick J. Dockstader
(New York Graphic Society; $25)

The Sumerians, a non-Semitic people in Mesopotamia, lived there starting about six thousands years ago; we have found out about them only in this century, with our knowledge increasing rapidly between the two World Wars. They left behind them a vast body of art and architecture, most of it only recently uncovered. As a distinctive people and certainly as the dominant power in their area, the Sumerians faded out of the picture something more than three thousand years ago, being succeeded at first by the Assyrians, more recently by Standard Oil.

The American Indians, on the other hand, a non-Caucasian people, have lived right here for a good deal longer than anyone else. The more recent settlers have known about the Indians ever since they knew about the place. The Indians, too, have created and to some extent are still creating a considerable body of art objects. Much of it has been turned up recently by the same tools used to reveal the achievement of Sumer, the archeologists' spades, but even more of it has always been around, readily available without digging, obtainable by find, by capture and by trade. More than that, the Indian material has been obtained. As Frederick Dockstader points out, beginning in the last century the United States Army deliberately amassed, classified and studied an enormous number of Indian artifacts: the effort was part of a Know-Your-Enemy program.

Unlike the Sumerians, the native enemy is still around and I suppose most of us feel rather sheepish when we think about him; perhaps that's the reason we think about him so little.

I daresay non-specialists don't spend much time contemplating the Sumerians, either; but the somewhat surprising thing revealed in the two sumptuous books here under review is this: the Indians, in their art, despite several centuries of war, exploitation, subjugation and other forms of intimacy, still seem utter strangers: exotic, savage, often very attractive, but fundamentally different from us. The Sumerians, whose very existence not many people were aware of 60 years ago, and who passed from the scene before any of our culture heroes in Greece even had a culture to be heroic, these real strangers nevertheless come to our attention in the magnificent photographs of Dr. Parrot's book, not only as a familiar but as our veritable ancestors.

Do we instinctively adopt such responses to defend ourselves against the necessity of doing something in justice for the Indian? There are passages in Dockstader that suggest he might say we do. Finally he wouldn't, of course, because the profound difference between Indian art and European art is one of the basic points of his text. The difference might be matter of social evolution. The Sumerians were citymen, or at least permanent townsfolk with cultivated fields, long before we know anything about them at all. The American Indians for the most part remained hunters until we roped them off or killed them. We ourselves are citymen, food cultivators; we had, perhaps, a moment of sharing the hunter's life of the Indian during the settling of the West, but gave it up as soon as possible and recognized it, always, as a momentary, necessary, lapse.

No doubt that's part of it. Yet there are early Sumerian drawings on pottery that take you right to the underground walls of Altamira; the feeling is closer to prehistoric cave-painting – the painting of a hunting economy – than anything in Indian art; and the time distance from Altamira to Sumer is many times the distance from Sumer to us.

The fact is, of course, that the Sumerians, if not ancestors of ours, were occasional associates of one important group of our forebears. The patriarch Abraham came out of the Sumerian city of Ur to begin the adventure that, modified a dozen times, is nevertheless still going on and in which we are ourselves involved. The ancient Israeli, wandering around their corner of outer Mesopotamia, encountered Sumer often. Biblical parallels come to light constantly in the Sumerian material. The distinctive form of Sumer, the ziggurat, is also part of the architecture of our minds, the Tower of Babel.

Not the least compelling feature of Dr. Parrot's text, by the way, is the direct comparison he makes between Sumerian and Israeli history and interpretation of history. The Tower of Babel is an example. As Moses tells the story, that most famous of ziggurats was built that its builders might climb to heaven. Dr. Parrot, on the other hand, reads all the Sumerian evidence the other way: the great staged towers were built as artificial mountains to enable the god to come down to earth. Thus the whole Hebraic tradition, in which we still largely live, is tied to Sumer; beyond Abraham and his children, beyond the ziggurat of Babel, beyond the flood, the area seems surely to be the scene described in the opening of *Genesis* as the earthly paradise.

Sumer goes into all this and much more, including the history of Mesopotamian archeology; as the first volume of M. Malraux's full-scale museum without walls, the book is a beauty. The text proceeds without interruption, but there are catalogue identifications of the 400 or so works of art, scholarly references, even a glossary, and numerous maps. The photography blocks out the object against black for the most part and this is particularly effective in color, of which there is a good deal. Following Malraux, both text and illustrations leap occasionally to simili-

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

François Bondy *is a French journalist and magazine editor.* Langston Hughes' *poem will appear in his next book,* Ask Your Mama – 12 Moods for Jazz, *to be published by Knopf in October.*

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tudes in Greece and the Romanesque and the whole shows a capacious grasp of art as part of man.

Professor Dockstader is no less comprehensive with his choice of American Indian material, from Alaska to Florida, from the East Coast to the West, from about 800 A.D. to the present day. The color is magnificent and plentiful, about 70 plates out of 250. Yet even with the Westporters of the Indians, those prodigies of conspicuous consumption, the Kwakiutl, we are only convinced that our debt is one we contracted, not, as with Sumer, one we were born of.

FRANK GETLEIN

Correspondence

The New Republic *welcomes communications in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less are most suitable for publication.*

Crisis in Berlin

Sirs:

It is disturbing when a serious student of world politics such as Professor Rabinowitch continues to have faith in Soviet promises, as disclosed in his article "A Scientist Looks at the Berlin Crisis" (August 7). It is naïve to believe, as he does, that Khrushchev's aims may be limited to having the West recognize "the East German regime and other aspects of the status quo in Eastern Europe." By now it should be obvious that the Russian leader is aiming first at neutralizing and then at controlling all of Germany. Furthermore, it is clear that international Communism, which controls Soviet policy, is a political movement offering salvation to all, which cannot accept the status quo, but must continue to try to advance wherever advancement is possible, or lose its reasons for being.

American foreign policy must be based upon a frank recognition that a major goal of Soviet policy is to eject us from all Europe. Instead of still trying to negotiate a permanent and realistic settlement with Khrushchev, we should recall his own warning that "negotiations, for the Communists, are simply weapons of conflict. To assume otherwise is pernicious self-delusion."

Unfortunately, it is no more possible to do business with Khrushchev than it was with Hitler. The difference between the two leaders is basically that whereas Hitler was a paranoid, Khrushchev is shrewd and coldly calculating, but equally unscrupulous.

Ernest T. Clough
Boston, Mass.

The Spanish Civil War

Sirs:

I wish that your traditional freedom from the cliché "fellow-travellers" had not been breached by Friedenberg's use of it (July 24).

To persons who think with some definiteness, and I hope, juridically, that kind of malicious contrivance that substitutes FBI-journalese defamation for criminality has been *the* major factor contributing to the rise of John Birchites and their like.

Albert L. Allen
Boston, Mass.

Sirs:

Having myself reviewed *The Spanish Civil War* by Hugh Thomas recently in *The Hartford Courant*, I was naturally interested in your review of the same book on July 24 by Daniel Friedenberg. What particularly disturbs me about the review is its apparent belief that objectivity in the writing of such history is both an impossible and an undesirable goal for the historian to pursue. As the review correctly indicates, Thomas did not come away from his study of the Civil War convinced that either the Republicans or the Nationalists would make nice people to live under. I am unable to understand how Mr. Friedenberg could question this judgment when it is realized that the number of atrocities committed by Republican adherents during the war probably exceeded those committed by the Fascists. The anarchists and Communists may have been the kindliest of philosophers, but their disrespect for human life and dignity does not entitle them to much respect in my eyes whatever their ultimate goals may have been.

It is apparent that Friedenberg lived, prayed for, and perhaps, fought for, the Republicans in Spain. But those events which carry so clear a meaning for one generation often appear in a far more ambiguous light once the passage of years has permitted an honest re-examination of their meaning. I am convinced that Mr. Thomas has done my generation a brilliant service by placing the Spanish Civil War in a proper historical perspective. It is therefore disappointing that *New Republic* readers were confronted with so biased a review of so unbiased a book.

Gordon H. Wentworth
West Hartford, Conn.

In reply:

Mr. Allen claims that I used "malicious contrivance" and "FBI-journalese defamation for criminality." Mr. Wentworth states that I take a biased view in favor of the former Loyalist regime. It is apparent that the Spanish Civil War still arouses violent sentiments. In one case I am accused of extreme Right wing sympathies and in the other Left wing sympathies: yet both men read the same review!

Insofar as Mr. Allen is concerned, I do not know what he means. I did indeed use the words "fellow-travellers" in

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What's a book club

If bookstores were as plentiful as grocers and druggists there would be no need for book clubs. The fact that only a few large cities can maintain bookstores of a size to carry a fair assortment of books means that the great majority of the people find their reading matter with difficulty and by chance. The book club is one answer to this problem.

Moreover, the bookstore prices of good books have been going up and up. In our economy, consumers are increasingly differentiating between the list and market prices of most items. The book club, by providing wide distribution – plus the convenience of mail delivery – enables readers to obtain books at substantial discounts. If you buy your books through The Mid-Century Book Society, you can save 50% or more through low member's prices and free bonus books of your own choice.

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reference to four men during the 1930's; of the three still alive it is obvious from their present writings they would all agree with my statement. As far as the second paragraph is concerned, if Mr. Allen would be so kind as to frame it into intelligible English I would be glad to respond.

Mr. Wentworth claims that my bias is obvious and he is quite right. I did support the Republicans and I do not regret it. History has indeed shown many of us the ugly side of the Communist infiltration and takeover of the Loyalist government by the end of the war. This was due, and I am in complete agreement with Hugh Thomas on the point, to the refusal of the democracies to aid and support the Republicans. I am not saying that the Communists might not have taken over the government despite such aid, but it is obvious that their cause was greatly aided by the refusal of England, France and the United States to give material aid.

My basic difference with Mr. Wentworth is that I question the statistics dealing with the atrocities committed by the Republicans since the greater part of this information in Mr. Hugh Thomas' book is gleaned from the official writings of Falange and Fascist sources. I may add that several careful studies have already been printed in Spanish during the last month by exiled non-Communist leaders confirming this point and showing that the so-called impartiality of Mr. Thomas is based on quoting these distorted figures.

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New York, N. Y.

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Questions of Conformity

Sirs:

In *The New Republic* of July 3 there is a very curious reference to me in Irving Howe's discussion of conformity which can hardly be intelligible to the reader. Mr. Howe writes:

> "Even serious people like Sidney Hook kept repeating that there was nothing necessarily better about being non-conformist than conformist, it all depended what one conformed to, etc., which was true as long as the points at issue concerned details of dress, food, clothes and cars, but was manifestly not true in regard to politics and culture."

If Mr. Howe's words have any logical meaning he is saying that in politics and culture non-conformity is desirable regardless of what one dissents from and the grounds of dissent. But this is patently absurd. After all Hitler was one of the greatest political non-conformists in the 20th Century. And so were many other dissenters against established forms of decency and fair play. Mr. Howe has got things precisely backwards. One may argue that with respect to dress, food, clothes, cars and similar matters, the grounds of conformity or unconformity are unimportant and that there exists no necessity of specifying what one is dissenting from or assenting to. But in politics and culture above all these questions are of the very essence. That is why it is fantastic – and in the end frivolous – to make a virtue of dissent as such. A man may be a dissenter in a dictatorship because he wants to establish another dictatorship – possibly a worse one.

I therefore fail to see any ground whatsoever on which Mr. Howe can legitimately contest my position, stated many years ago:

> "I see no specific virtue in the attitude of conformity or non-conformity. The important thing is that it should be voluntary, rooted in considered judgment, an authentic expression of some value or insight for which the individual is prepared to risk something. 'Conformity' and non-conformity' are relational

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terms. Before evaluating them I should like to know *to* and *what* a person is conforming or not conforming and *how*. Under the Weimar Republic, Stefan George, Spengler and Hitler were non-conformists: under the Czarist regime Dostoyevsky in his most fruitful years was a conformist. To the greatest of men the terms 'conformist' or 'non-conformist' have singularly little relevance–Shakespeare, Milton, Goethe, Plato, Aristotle, Kant or Dewey." (From *Political Power and Personal Freedom*, "The Intellectual in America.")

Sidney Hook
New York, N. Y.

In reply:

How can anyone disagree with Mr. Hook's last paragraph? And how much can anyone profit from it? The question raised in my *NR* review of July 3, as with more detail some years ago in a *Partisan Review* essay, "This Age of Conformity," did not concern George, Spengler or Hitler, dead red herrings all of them, nor did it have anything to do with a universal principle of nonconformity for its own sake.

During the 1950's there was a notable turn among American intellectuals toward a conservative accommodation to the *status quo*. It was particularly disturbing in the writings of those influential figures who dominated the American Committee for Cultural Freedom and the pages of *The New Leader* and *Commentary*, for many of them had been distinguished previously in upholding the tradition of liberal-radical dissent.

It was to defend this particular, serious, historically specifiable tradition that I tried to distinguish it from the chatter, which kept increasing in the 1950's, about nonconformity as a mere matter of fashion and style. The problem, as I wrote in *NR*, was "the relation between the intellectual and American society. Should he continue to speak as a critic of the *status quo* . . . or should he become part of the Establishment?" Concerning *that* question, unlike cars, clothes, etc., it mattered very much whether one was nonconformist. And that is why I wrote the sentence Mr. Hook finds objectionable, and why I continue to feel his generalized reflections not to the point.

Irving Howe
Boston, Mass.

Cuba's Middle Class

Sirs:

To read Ernst Halperin's article "Cuba's Middle Class" (August 7) is to receive the impression that the members of this class who oppose Castro and are trying to leave Cuba are motivated entirely by the loss of their property and class privileges or their fear of losing the small workshops and businesses that Castro has promised not to confiscate. Have we been misinformed by the reports which have told us that those who have left or are attempting to leave include engineers, teachers, journalists, physicians and even propertied members of the middle class who supported Castro originally because they wanted the economic, social and political reforms that he promised, and who left or want to leave because he has instead set up a political dictatorship and destroyed civil and intellectual liberties? Have we been misled by those who have told us Castro's revolution was a middle-class revolution? If not, how is it that Mr. Halperin encountered none of those middle-class revolutionaries who supported Castro because they wanted an end to the poverty and illiteracy of the peasants and oppose him because he has set up a "Socialist state"; how is it that he encountered only the middle-class opponents of Castro who consider their former way of life – with its poverty and illiteracy for the peasants – blameless?

B. H. Haggin
Cambridge, Mass.

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

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